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Abstract
The semantic framework for the modal logic of knowledge due to Halpern and Moses pro-
vides a way to ascribe knowledge to agents in distributed and multi-agent systems. In this
paper we study two special cases of this framework: full systems and hypercubes. Both model
static situations in which no agent has any information about another agent’s state. Full sys-
tems and hypercubes are an appropriate model for the initial configurations of many systems
of interest. We establish a correspondence between full systems and hypercube systems and
certain classes of Kripke frames. We show that these classes of systems correspond to the
same logic. Moreover, this logic is also the same as that generated by the larger class of weakly
directed frames. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization, S5WDn, of this logic. Fi-
nally, we show that under certain natural assumptions, in a model where knowledge evolves
over time, S5WDn characterizes the properties of knowledge not just at the initial configura-
tion, but also at all later configurations. In particular, this holds for homogeneous broadcast
systems, which capture settings in which agents are initially ignorant of each others local
states, operate synchronously, have perfect recall and can communicate only by broadcasting.
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1 Introduction
Modal logics of knowledge have been proposed as a formal tool for specifying and reasoning about
multi-agent systems in a number of disciplines, including Distributed Computing [HM90], Artificial
Intelligence [McC89] and Economics [Aum76, RW90].
The logic most commonly applied in this area is the logic S5n, a generalization to a multi-agent
setting of the logic S5 (see, e.g., [HC96] and [Gol92]), which was originally proposed as a model of
knowledge by Hintikka [Hin62] in Philosophical Logic. This application of S5 interprets the modal
formula ✷φ as “it is known that φ”. So interpreted, the logic S5 models an ideal agent, whose
knowledge has the properties of being veridical (everything the agent knows is true), and being
closed under positive introspection (the agent knows what it knows) and negative introspection
(it knows what it does not know). These properties have been the subject of a significant body of
criticism in the philosophical literature, but S5 remains an appropriate model for applications in
computer science and economics, since it captures an information theoretic notion of knowledge
of interest in these areas.
The logic S5n is a multi-modal version of S5, including for each i = 1 . . . n an operator ✷i. The
intended interpretation is that each i = 1, . . . , n represents an agent, and ✷iφ expresses “agent
i knows that φ.” The logic S5n can be axiomatized by taking all the propositional tautologies;
the axiom schemas ✷i(p ⇒ q) ⇒ ✷ip ⇒ ✷iq, and ✷ip ⇒ p, and ✷ip ⇒ ✷i✷ip, and ¬✷i¬p ⇒
✷i¬✷i¬p, and the inference rules Modus Ponens, Necessitation and Uniform Substitution.
The logic S5n has also been extended to deal with properties that arise when we investigate
the state of knowledge of the group. Subtle concepts like common knowledge and distributed
knowledge have been investigated, as has the combination of the logic of knowledge and time (see
[FHMV95, MH95] for extensive treatments of this literature.) Although the focus of research in
this area has been on the combination of the knowledge modalities, modeled by S5, with modalities
expressing other mental states, it has been noted that in certain situations, the axioms of S5WDn
provide an incomplete description of the properties of knowledge. One of the characteristics of
the S5n axioms is that they do not appear to state any interaction between one agent’s knowledge
and that of another. Some such interactions nevertheless follow, e.g., it can be shown that ✷iφ⇒
¬✷j¬φ is valid in S5n. (This formula above states that agent j cannot rule out the possibility of
a fact known by agent i.) However, there are specific settings in which further such interactions
hold. For example, consider a distributed system composed of a group of agents A = {1, . . . , n}
and the following situations:
One agent knowing everything the others know. An agent j is the central librarian of a
distributed system of agents that rely on j to maintain all their knowledge.
Linear order in agents’ private knowledge. The agents operate within a chain of command
subject to security restrictions. Each agent in the chain has a higher security clearance than
the previous agent, and has access to a larger set of information sources.
These and similar scenarios can be modeled by extensions of S5n in which interaction axioms
are imposed. Write Si,j for the axiom schema ✷iφ ⇒ ✷jφ. Then the first example above can be
modeled by the logic S5n plus Si,j for all i ∈ A. The second scenario can be described by assuming
an order on the set of agents reflecting their increasing information, and by taking S5n plus Si,j
for all i ≤ j. These are just two isolated examples but there is actually a broad spectrum of
possible specifications on how private states of knowledge are affected by other agents’ knowledge
(see [LR99] for a detailed exposition). At one end of the spectrum we have the system S5 in which
all agents have the same knowledge. This can be modeled by taking an extension of S5n in which
the axiom Si,j holds for all i, j ∈ A, making all the modalities collapse onto each other. This is
a very strong constraint. At the other end of the spectrum is simply S5n. Catach [Cat88] has
studied a limited class of such interactions between knowledge of the agents.
While the examples of interaction axioms above derive directly from static assumptions about
the interaction between agents’ knowledge, there are also cases where such interactions arise in
more subtle ways. Rather than start with assumptions that are directly about interactions between
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agents’ knowledge, one could begin with an extensional model of distributed systems, of the kind
commonly used in studies of distributed computing. The notion of interpreted system of Halpern
and Moses [HM90, FHMV95] takes this approach. The interpreted systems model describes a
multi-agent system in terms of the local states of the agents and how such local states evolve over
time as the agents communicate. A local state may be as mundane as a listing of the values of
the set of variables maintained by the agent, or it could be a richly structured representation of
the information available to the agent. A global state consists of a local state for each agent, plus
a state for the environment within which the agents operate. In general, there may be constraints
connecting the components of a global state, so not every possible global state need occur in the
system.
One can define two situations in such a system to be equivalent for agent i if the agent has the
same local state in these situations. This equivalence relation can then be used as the accessibility
relation corresponding to agent i’s knowledge operator ✷i. This approach provides an information
theoretic notion of knowledge that has been been found useful in analyses of distributed systems
(see [FHMV95] for discussion of a number of examples and extensive citations.)
Generally, the logic of knowledge that arises from this semantic framework is S5n. However,
it has been noted that in certain quite natural special cases, additional axioms arise that state
interactions between agents knowledge. Fagin et al. [FHV92, FV86] present one such example.
They study systems in which agents with perfect recall, operating in a static world, communicate
their knowledge about that world by means of unreliable message passing.
In this paper we introduce and study another special case of the interpreted systems model
that results in interaction axioms and can be axiomatized by an extension of S5n that falls into
the above-mentioned spectrum. The classes of systems we investigate are called full systems and
hypercubes. Both are systems in which every possible combination of individual agents’ local
states occurs in some global state in the system. In hypercubes we require additionally that
every combination of state of the environment and the agents’ local states occurs. Full systems
and hypercubes are appropriate classes of systems for modeling the initial configurations of many
systems of interest, in which no agent has any information concerning any other agent’s state.
(Thus each agent considers possible every combination of the other agents’ local states.)
Full systems and hypercubes may be shown to satisfy an axiom that does not follow from
S5n. This axiom states in a quite intuitive fashion the property that every combination of the
individual agent’s local states occurs in some global state of the system. By characterizing full
systems and hypercubes in terms of certain classes of Kripke frames, we establish a sound and
complete axiomatization of the logic of knowledge in these classes of systems. Interestingly, the
two classes correspond to the same logic, which we call S5WDn. The nomenclature arises from
the fact that we show that a further class of frames, the weakly directed frames, corresponds to
the same logic. We also show that S5WDn is decidable.
The definition of full systems and hypercubes takes a static viewpoint of multi-agent systems
that does not use the full power of the interpreted systems model, which is also capable of modeling
the evolution of knowledge over time. As noted above, these definitions provide an appropriate
characterization of the agents’ knowledge in the initial configurations of many distributed systems.
However, we show that the logic S5WDn has broader applicability than simply reasoning about
such initial configurations. We also study in this paper the dynamic behavior of knowledge in
homogeneous broadcast environments. These model a particular communication architecture, in
which agents operate synchronously and can communicate only by broadcasting information to all
agents. We assume that agents have perfect recall, and that their initial configuration is character-
ized by a hypercube. We show that not just the initial configuration, but all configurations arising
in such a system can be characterized using a full system. It follows that S5WDn exactly captures
the properties of knowledge in homogeneous broadcast systems. Since S5WDn extends S5n, this
provides another example of a natural situation in which S5n is an incomplete characterization of
the logic of knowledge, analogous to the results of Fagin et al. [FHV92, FV86].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the two standard semantics for
knowledge in multi-agent systems (Kripke models and interpreted systems), and we introduce full
systems and hypercubes. In Section 3 we formally relate full systems and hypercubes to Kripke
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models by identifying corresponding classes of Kripke frames. We also show that with respect to
the logic of knowledge we consider in this paper these classes of frames generate the same logic.
In Section 4 we present a sound and complete axiomatization S5WDn for this logic. We prove the
logic decidable in Section 5. These sections all deal with a static framework. In Section 6 we go
on to consider a dynamic framework that models how agents’ knowledge changes over time. We
define homogeneous broadcast systems, and show that agents’ states of knowledge in such systems
can be characterized by a hypercube at each point of time, thereby showing that S5WDn is also a
sound and complete axiomatization of the logic of knowledge in homogeneous broadcast systems.
We illustrate the theory with an example of a two-person card game. Finally, in Section 7 we
draw our conclusions and we suggest further work.
2 Definitions
Amongst the approaches that have been proposed to the semantics of logics for knowledge are
interpreted systems and Kripke models. The two approaches have different advantages and dis-
advantages. On the one hand, interpreted systems provide a more concrete and intuitive way to
model real systems, but on the other hand Kripke models come with an heritage of fundamental
techniques that may be used to prove properties of the logic.
In this section we briefly recall the key definitions of Kripke frames and interpreted systems.
We then we define hypercube systems and full systems, the particular classes of systems that are
the focus of this paper.
We use the following mathematical notations throughout. If W is a set, we write |W | for its
cardinality. If ∼ is an equivalence relation on W and w ∈ W , then we write W/∼ for the set of
equivalence classes of ∼, and write [w]∼ for the equivalence class containing w.
2.1 Kripke models
Kripke models [Kri59] were first formally proposed in Philosophical Logic. They have since been
used within computer science and Artificial Intelligence as semantic structures for logics for belief,
logics for knowledge, temporal logics, logics for actions, etc., all of which are modal logics. Over
the last thirty years, many formal techniques have been developed for the study of modal logics
grounded on Kripke semantics, such as completeness proofs via canonical models, decidability
via the finite model property [HC96], and more recently, techniques for combining logics [KW91,
Gab96].
We now briefly recall a few concepts from this literature that we will be using later in the
paper. For more technical details and motivation, the reader is referred to an introduction to
modal logic, such as [HC96] or [Gol92] or [HC84]. We state our definitions for the multi-modal
case, which is a slight generalization of those in much of the literature.
We assume a set Atoms = {p, . . .} of propositional atoms, and a finite A = {1, . . . , n} of agents.
We will deal primarily with a formal language given by the following grammar:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | ✷iφ
where p ∈ Atoms and i ∈ A. We write Ln for the set of formulae generated by this grammar when
A = {1, . . . , n}. Intuitively the formula ✷iφ represents the situation in which the agent i knows
the fact represented by the formula φ. Other propositional connectives such as disjunction and
implication can be defined in the usual way. If W is a set, then idW is the identity relation on W ,
i.e., the relation {(w,w) | w ∈W}.
Kripke semantics is based on the following structures.
Definition 2.1 (Kripke frames and Kripke models) A frame F is a tuple F = (W,R1, . . . ,
Rn), where W is a non-empty set (called set of worlds) and for each i ∈ A the component Ri is a
binary relation on W . If all relations are equivalence relations, the frame is an equivalence frame
and we write ∼i for Ri.
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A model M is a tuple M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, π), where (W,R1, . . . , Rn) is a frame called its
underlying frame and π : W → 2Atoms is an interpretation for the atoms. An equivalence model
is a model whose underlying frame is an equivalence frame.
We will call equivalence frames E frames and equivalence models E-models. The class of equivalence
frames will be denoted by FE. The class of all equivalence models is frequently taken to be the
appropriate class of structures for the logic of knowledge.1 The logic corresponding to this class
of structures is the logic S5n [HM90].
Committing an abuse of notation, given a frame F = (W,R1, . . . , Rn), and an interpretation π,
we will sometimes denoteM = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, π) asM = (F, π). Also when the set A = {1, . . . , n}
is clear from the context, we will denote M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, π) as M = (W, {Ri}i∈A, π) and
F = (W,R1, . . . , Rn) as F = (W, {Ri}i∈A).
Definition 2.2 (Satisfaction) The satisfaction of a formula φ in a world w of a model M ,
formally M |=w φ is inductively defined as follows:
M |=w p if p ∈ π(w)
M |=w ¬φ if M 6|=w φ
M |=w φ ∧ ψ if M |=w φ and M |=w ψ
M |=w ✷iψ if for each w′ ∈W , wRiw′ implies M |=w′ ψ
Satisfaction for the other logical connectives can be defined in the usual way.
Validity is also defined by means of the standard definition:
Definition 2.3 (Validity) A formula φ is valid on a model M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, π), if for every
point w ∈W we have M |=w φ. A formula φ is valid on a frame F = (W,R1, . . . , Rn) if for every
interpretation π we have (F, π) |= φ. A class of models M validates a formula φ, denoted M |= φ,
if for every model M ∈M we have M |= φ. A formula φ is valid on a class of frames F , denoted
F |= φ, if for every frame F ∈ F we have F |= φ.
Two frames F = (W,R1, . . . , Rn) and F
′ = (W ′, R′1, . . . , R
′
n) are said to be isomorphic if there
exists a bijective function h :W →W ′ such that for each i = 1 . . . n and all points w,w′ ∈ W we
have wRiw
′ if and only if h(w)R′ih(w
′). We write F ≡ F ′ when this is the case.
We clearly have the following.
Theorem 2.1 If F and F ′ are frames with F ≡ F ′ then for all ψ ∈ Ln we have F |= ψ if and
only if F ′ |= ψ.
Slightly more general than the notion of frame isomorphism is the notion of p-morphism. We
can define these both at the level of frames and at the level of Kripke models.
Definition 2.4 (p-morphism) Let F = (W,R1, . . . , Rn) and F
′ = (W ′, R′1, . . . , R
′
n) be frames.
A frame p-morphism from F to F ′ is a mapping p :W → W ′ that satisfies
1. the function p is surjective, and
2. for all u, v ∈W and each i = 1 . . . n, if uRiv then p(u)Rip(v), and
3. for each i = 1 . . . n and u ∈ W and v′ ∈ W ′, if p(u)R′iv
′ then there exists v ∈ W such that
uRiv and p(v) = v
′.
If M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, π) and M
′ = (W ′, R′1, . . . , R
′
n, π
′) are Kripke structures, then a model p-
morphism fromM toM ′ is a mapping p : W →W ′ that is a frame p-morphism from (W,R1, . . . , Rn)
to (W ′, R′1, . . . , R
′
n) and satisfies q ∈ π
′(p(w)) if and only if q ∈ π(w) for all propositions
q ∈ Atoms and all worlds w ∈ W .
1 Philosophers have long held qualms about properties of knowledge (such as negative introspection) that are
consequences of this class of structures [Len78]. For computer scientists and economists, however, equivalence
frames capture an information theoretic notion of knowledge that is useful for their applications.
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The following result shows that p-morphisms preserve satisfaction and validity for the language
Ln.
Theorem 2.2 ([HC84] page 73) If p is a model p-morphism from M to M ′ then for all worlds w
of M and formulae ϕ ∈ Ln, we have M |=w ϕ if and only if M ′ |=p(w) ϕ. Thus ϕ is valid on M
if and only if ϕ is valid on M ′.
If p is a frame p-morphism from F to F ′ then for all ϕ ∈ Ln, we have that if ϕ is valid on F
then ϕ is valid on F ′.
Two classes of frames F1,F2 are validity-equivalent with respect a language L, denoted F1 ≡L
F2, if for all formulae ϕ ∈ L, we have F1 |= ϕ if and only if F2 |= ϕ.
Theorem 2.3 Suppose that F1 and F2 are classes of frames such that for all F ∈ F1 there exists a
p-morphism from F to a frame F ′ ∈ F2, and conversely, for all F ∈ F2 there exists a p-morphism
from F to a frame F ′ ∈ F1. Then F1 ≡Ln F2
One further property of the language Ln that will be of use to us is the fact that satisfaction of
a formula at a world depends only on worlds connected to that world. Say that two worlds w,w′ of
a frame F = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼n) are connected if there exists a finite sequence w = w0, . . . , wk = w′
of worlds inW such that for j = 0 . . . k−1 we have wj ∼i wj+1 for some i. Say that F is connected
if for all pairs of worlds w,w′ ∈ W are connected. The connected component of F containing a
world w is the frame Fw = (Ww,∼′1, . . . ,∼
′
n) where Ww is the set of worlds of F connected to
w, and each ∼′i is the restriction of ∼i to Ww. Similarly, the connected component of a model
M = (F, π) containing a world w is the model Mw = (Fw, π
′) where π′ is the restriction of π
to Ww. The model Mw is also called the model generated by w from M . The following result
(see, e.g., [HC84] page 80) makes precise the claim that satisfaction of a formula of Ln at a world
depends only on connected worlds.
Theorem 2.4 For all worlds w of a model M and for all formulae ψ ∈ Ln we have M |=w φ if
and only if Mw |=w φ.
A class of frames F corresponds to a formula ψ if for all frames F , we have F ∈ F if and only
if F |= ψ. We consider such correspondences between classes of frames and formulae at several
places in the paper, since they frequently indicate that the formula can be used to obtain an
axiomatization of the class of frames.
2.2 Interpreted systems
Interpreted systems are a model for distributed and multi-agent systems proposed by Fagin,
Halpern, Moses and Vardi [FHMV95, HF85], based on an earlier model of Halpern and Moses
[HM90]. They provide a general theoretical framework within which it is possible to model a
variety of modes of communication, failure properties of communication channels, and assump-
tions about coordination such as synchrony and asynchrony. Its specific focus is to enable states of
knowledge to be ascribed to the agents in the system, and to study the evolution of this knowledge
as agents communicate. For discussion of axiomatic properties of this model see [FHMV95] and
[HMV97].
The key aspect of interpreted systems that allows knowledge to be ascribed to agents is the
notion of local state. Intuitively, the local state of an agent captures the complete scope of the
information about the system that is accessible to the agent. This may include the values of its
personal variables and data structures, its record of prior communications, etc. The agents’ local
states, together with a state of the environment within which they operate, determines the global
state of the system at any given time.
Consider n sets of local states, one for every agent of the system, and a set of states for the
environment. We denote by Li the non-empty sets of local states possible for agent i, and by
Le the non-empty set of possible states for the environment. Elements of Li will be denoted by
l1, l2, . . . . Elements of Le will be denoted by le, . . . .
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Definition 2.5 (System of global states) A system of global states for n agents is a subset of
a Cartesian product Le × L1 × · · · × Ln. An interpreted system of global states is a pair (S, π)
where S is a system of global states and π : S → 2Atoms is an interpretation function for the
atoms.
The reason for considering a subset is that some of the tuples in the Cartesian product might
not be possible because of explicit constraints present in the multi-agent system. The framework
of Fagin et al. [FHMV95] models the temporal evolution of a system by means of runs, which are
functions from the natural numbers to the set of global states. An interpreted system, in their
terminology, is a set of runs over global states together with a valuation for the atoms of the
language on points of these runs. We simplify this notion here, since we will deal initially with an
atemporal setting. However, we will consider a run-like construct in Section 6.
As shown in [FHMV95], interpreted systems can be used to ascribe knowledge to the agents
by considering two global states to be indistinguishable for an agent if its local state is the same
in the two global states. We formulate this here as a mapping from systems of global states to
Kripke frames.
Definition 2.6 The function F mapping systems of global states to Kripke frames is defined as
follows: if S ⊆ Le×L1×. . .×Ln is a set of global states for n agents then F (S) is the Kripke frame
(W,∼1, . . . ,∼n), with W = S, and for each i = 1 . . . n the relation ∼i defined by (l1, . . . , ln) ∼i
(l′1, . . . , l
′
n) if li = l
′
i. The function F is naturally extended to map interpreted systems of global
states to Kripke models as follows: if F (S) = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼n) then F (S, π) = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼n, π).
Note that for all systems of global states S, the frame F (S) is an equivalence frame. Combined
with the semantic interpretation of the language Ln on Kripke models, this mapping provides a
way to interpret Ln on interpreted systems of global states (for n agents). We say that φ ∈ Ln is
valid on an interpreted system of global states (S, π) if φ is valid on the model F (S, π). Similarly,
φ is valid on the system S of global states if φ is valid on F (S, π) for all interpretations π.
2.3 Hypercube systems and full systems
We now define two classes of systems of global states, full systems and hypercube systems, that
provide an intuitive model for the initial situation in many systems of interest. These classes both
capture situations in which the agents do not have information about each others’ local states. In
hypercubes the environment is assumed trivial, so there is no interesting correlation between the
agents’ states and the environment.
Definition 2.7 (Hypercube systems) A hypercube system, or hypercube, is a Cartesian prod-
uct H = Le×L1×· · ·×Ln, where Le is a singleton and L1, . . . , Ln are non-empty sets. The class
of hypercube systems is denoted by H.
In full systems, the agents may, however, have some information about how their local state
correlates with the state of the environment.
Definition 2.8 (Full system) A system S ⊆ Le × L1 × · · · × Ln is full if for every tuple
〈l1, . . . , ln〉 ∈ L1 × · · · × Ln there exists s ∈ Le such that 〈s, l1, . . . , ln〉 ∈ S. The class of full
systems is denoted by FS.
Clearly, every hypercube is full. The converse is not true. The following example illustrates
these definitions.
Example 2.1 Consider a card game with n players and n decks of cards. At the start of play,
each player is dealt a hand of 12 cards, with player i’s cards all drawn from deck i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Each player sees only their own hand, and not the hand of other players, nor the undealt cards
remaining in any of the decks.
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The situation at the start of play may be described as a system of global states as follows. Let
D be the set of all cards constituting a deck. A hand of 12 cards corresponds to a set S ⊆ D with
|S| = 12. Let H be the set of such sets S. Then the set of possible local states for each agent
i = 1 . . . n is Li = H. The set of possible states of the environment is Le = {D \ S | S ∈ H}n,
i.e. the set of arrangements in which each of the n decks has 12 cards removed. The set of global
states of the system is
S = {〈s, h1, . . . , hn〉 | hi ∈ Li for i = 1 . . . n and s = 〈D \ h1, . . . , D \ hn〉}.
This system is full, but not a hypercube. Using this modeling of the initial state of the game,
we may address questions concerning what a player knows about the undealt cards. If the only
issue of concern is a player’s knowledge about the cards that have been dealt, a more appropriate
modeling of the game may be to take S = {1} ×Hn as the system of global states. This system is
a hypercube. (We note that the initial situation in most cardgames, where players are dealt their
hand from the same deck, is neither a hypercube nor a full system. For example, a situation in
which two players both hold the ace of spades is not possible in such a game.)
We will show in Section 6 that the applicability of the class of full systems and hypercubes
goes beyond that of modeling the initial configurations of naturally occurring systems. We will
define a dynamic framework that shows how agents’ knowledge changes over time, and illustrate it
with extensions of the card-deck example. Our first aim, however, will be to axiomatize the class
of hypercubes and full systems. In order to use the tools of modal logics for this aim we formally
relate these classes of systems to several classes of Kripke frames.
3 Classes of frames corresponding to hypercubes and full
systems
In this section we identify a number of properties of frames that can be used to characterize
the frames corresponding to full systems and hypercubes up to isomorphism. We also show
that, somewhat surprisingly, full systems and hypercubes generate precisely the same set of valid
formulae of the language Ln. We obtain this result by establishing the existence of p-morphisms
between frames in the classes of frames corresponding to these classes of systems.
3.1 Directed frames
We have seen above that every system of global states generates a frame. Our aim in this section
is to characterize the frames generated by hypercubes and by full systems. The following result
identifies some properties of the resulting frames based on the properties of the system of global
states.
Lemma 3.1 Let S be a system of global states, and let F (S) = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼n) be the frame
defined from it by Definition 2.6.
1. If S is a hypercube then F (S) is such that
⋂
i∈A∼i = idW ;
2. If S is full and n ≥ 2 then F (S) is connected.
3. If S is full then for any w1, . . . , wn ∈ W there exists a w ∈ W such that wi ∼i w for each
i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof For (1), suppose that S is a hypercube and consider any two elements w = (le, l1, . . . , ln),
w′ = (le, l
′
1, . . . , l
′
n) in W such that w(
⋂
i∈A ∼i)w
′. (Note that the first component of these tuples
must be the same if S is a hypercube.) Then for all i in A, (le, l1, . . . , ln) ∼i (le, l′1, . . . , l
′
n).
Therefore, by definition of the relations ∼i, for all i in A we have li = l
′
i, that is w = w
′.
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For (2), suppose that S is full and let w = (le, l1, . . . , ln) and w
′ = (l′e, l
′
1, . . . , l
′
n) be points in
S. Since S is full there exists l′′e such that w
′′ = (l′′e , l1, l
′
2 . . . , l
′
n) is in W . Clearly w ∼1 w
′′ ∼2 w′.
Thus, there is a path from w to w′ of length two.
For (3), suppose that S is full and consider any w1 = (l
1
e , l
1
1, . . . , l
1
n), . . . , wn = (l
n
e , l
n
1 , . . . , l
n
n).
Since S is full there exists le such that w = (le, l
1
1, . . . , l
n
n) ∈ S. By Definition 2.6, the world w is
in W and by construction for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have wi ∼i w. ✷
This shows that Kripke frames that we build from the hypercubes and full systems by means
of the standard technique ([FHMV95]) constitute a proper subclass of the class of equivalence
frames. We will show that the properties of Lemma 3.1 can be used to characterize the images of
the hypercubes and full systems.
We will say that a frame (W,∼1, . . . ,∼n) has the identity intersection property, or is an I
frame, if
⋂
i∈A∼i = idW . Similarly, we say that a frame is directed, or is a D frame, if for any
w1, . . . , wn ∈ W there exists a w ∈ W such that wi ∼i w for each i = 1, . . . , n. We will also
use combinations of these letters to refer to frames satisfying several of these properties. Thus,
directed equivalence frames with the identity intersection property will be called EDI frames.
Similarly, we subscript F by these letters to indicate the class of frames have the corresponding
properties; thus FEDI denotes the class of EDI frames. Lemma 3.1 states that the image of a full
system under F is an ED frame and since every hypercube is full, the image of a hypercube is an
EDI frame.
The converse of these properties is not true, e.g., it is not the case that every ED frame is the
image of a hypercube. However, something very close to this is the case:
Lemma 3.2 1. For every ED frame F there exists a full system S such that F (S) ≡ F .
2. For every EDI frame F there exists a hypercube S such that F (S) ≡ F .
Proof We first show part (1). Let F = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼n) be an ED frame. Take S ⊆ W ×
W/∼1 × . . .×W/∼n to be the set of tuples 〈w, [w]∼1 , . . . , [w]∼n〉 where w ∈ W . We show that S
is a full system and such that F (S) ≡ F . F (S) ≡ F .
To see that S is full, let w1, . . . wn ∈ W . We show that there exists w ∈ W such that
〈w, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [wn]∼n〉 ∈ S. Since F is a D frame, there exists a world w such that w ∼i wi
for each i = 1 . . . n. Thus 〈w, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [wn]∼n〉 = 〈w, [w]∼1 , . . . , [w]∼n〉 ∈ S. This shows that S
is full.
Write F (S) = (S,∼′1, . . . ,∼
′
n). To show that F (S) ≡ F , define the mapping h : S → W by
h(〈w, [w]∼1 , . . . , [w]∼n〉) = w. It is clear that h is a bijection. Moreover,
〈w1, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [w1]∼n〉 ∼
′
i 〈w2, [w2]∼1 , . . . , [w2]∼n〉
iff [w1]∼i = [w2]∼i
iff w1 ∼i w2
iff h(〈w1, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [w1]∼n〉) ∼i h(〈w2, [w2]∼1 , . . . , [w2]∼n〉).
Thus, h is a frame isomorphism, establishing F (S) ≡ F . This completes the proof of part (1).
For part (2), let F = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼n) be an EDI frame. Define S = {1}×W/∼1×. . .×W/∼n.
Clearly S is a hypercube. Write F (S) = (S,∼′1, . . . ,∼
′
n). We show that F (S) ≡ F .
Consider an element 〈1, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [wn]∼n〉 of S. Since F is a D frame, there exists w ∈ W
such that w ∈ [wi]∼i for each i = 1, . . . , n. Moreover, because F is an I frame this w is unique.
Define the mapping h : S → W by taking h(〈1, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [wn]∼n〉) to be the unique w such that
w ∈ [wi]∼i for each i = 1, . . . , n. The mapping h is surjective because for each w ∈ W we have
h(〈1, [w]∼1 , . . . , [w]∼n〉) = w. Moreover h is injective because if h(〈1, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [wn]∼n〉) = w =
h(〈1, [w′1]∼1 , . . . , [w
′
n]∼n〉) then for each i = 1 . . . n we have that w is in both [wi]∼i and [w
′
i]∼i .
Thus, these equivalence classes must be the identical, and hence the tuples 〈1, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [wn]∼n〉
and 〈1, [w′1]∼1 , . . . , [w
′
n]∼n〉 are identical.
It remains to show that h has the homomorphism property. For this, note that by construction,
for each i = 1, . . . , n we have h(〈1, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [wn]∼n〉) ∼i wi. Thus if 〈1, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [wn]∼n〉 ∼
′
i
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Figure 1: Two p-morphic frames used in the proof of Lemma 3.3
〈1, [w′1]∼1 , . . . , [w
′
n]∼n〉 then [wi]∼i = [w
′
i]∼i , hence h(〈1, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [wn]∼n〉) ∼i wi ∼i w
′
i ∼i
h(〈1, [w′1]∼1 , . . . , [w
′
n]∼n〉). Conversely, suppose u = h(〈1, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [wn]∼n〉) and v = h(〈1,
[w′1]∼1 , . . . , [w
′
n]∼n〉) and u ∼i v. By definition of h, u ∈ [wi]∼i and v ∈ [w
′
i]∼i . Since u ∼i v it
follows that [wi]∼i = [w
′
i]∼i . Thus, 〈1, [w1]∼1 , . . . , [wn]∼n〉 ∼
′
i 〈1, [w
′
1]∼1 , . . . , [w
′
n]∼n〉. Thus, h is
a frame isomorphism, establishing F (S) ≡ F . This completes the proof of part (2). ✷
Using Theorem 2.1, it follows from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 that from the point of view of
the language Ln, full systems and ED frames are equivalent, as are hypercubes and EDI frames.
Stated more precisely, we have the following.
Theorem 3.1 F (H) ≡Ln FEDI and F (FS) ≡Ln FED.
Our strategy for axiomatising these classes of systems will be to focus on the corresponding
classes of frames instead. One approach to this would be to seek axioms that correspond to the
properties D and I. This turns out not to be possible.
Lemma 3.3 No modal formula corresponds to property I.
Proof Suppose the opposite and assume there is a formula φ that corresponds to property I.
Consider the frame F ′ in Figure 1. The frame F ′ is an I frame, so F ′ |= φ. Consider now the
frame F and a function p : F ′ → F such that p maps points in F according to the names in
the Figure. It is easy to see that p is a p-morphism from F ′ to F . Since p-morphisms preserve
validity on frames (Theorem 2.2) we have that F |= φ. But F is not an I frame and we have a
contradiction. ✷
Similar reasoning shows that the above holds even by restricting to equivalence frames.
As an aside, we note that this result is very sensitive to the language under consideration. There
are extensions of the language under which it fails. For example, consider a language containing an
operator for distributed knowledge [FHV92]. This operator is used to express the knowledge that
the group of all agents would have if they pooled their information. Formally, if φ is a formula,
then so is DAφ. The formula DAφ is interpreted by associating the relation ∼ =
⋂
i∈A ∼i to the
operator DA in the standard Kripke-style interpretation, i.e., we define M |=w DAψ if M |=w′ ψ
for all w′ ∼ w. Using this operator, we can prove a correspondence result for the intersection
property.
Lemma 3.4 An equivalence frame F is an I frame if and only if F |= φ⇔ DAφ.
Proof Left to right. Let M be a model based on F such that M |=w φ. Since
⋂
i∈A ∼i= idW ,
then M |=w DAφ. Analogously, suppose M |=w DAφ. Since w(
⋂
i∈A ∼i)w we have M |=w φ.
Right to left. Suppose F |= φ ⇔ DAφ and for all i we have w1 ∼i w2. Take a valuation π such
that p ∈ π(w) if and only if w = w1. Since F, π |=w1 p ⇔ DAp and (F, π) |=w1 p, we have
(F, π) |=w1 DAp and so (F, π) |=w2 p. But since π(p) = {w1}, it must be that w1 = w2. ✷
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Figure 2: A DI frame mapping a D frame via a p-morphism
This result suggests that the axiom φ ⇔ DAφ could be used as part of an axiomatization of
the class of EDI frames when the language includes the distributed knowledge operator. We are
concerned in this paper, however, with a weaker language. Lemma 3.3 suggests that it may be
inappropriate to focus on the identity intersection property in seeking to obtain the axiomatization.
Indeed, it turns out that this property has no impact on the set of valid formulae of Ln in the
context of interest to us. More precisely, we have the following result.
Theorem 3.2 FEDI ≡Ln FED
To establish Theorem 3.2, we prove that any ED frame can be seen as the target of a p-
morphism from an EDI frame; the result will then follow from Theorem 2.3 using the fact that
p-morphisms between frames preserve validity and that the class of DI frames is a subclass of
the class of D frames. (Note that the identity map on a frame is a frame isomorphism, hence a
p-morphism.)
Consider an ED frame F = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼m). Write ∼ for the relation
⋂
i=1...m ∼i; since each
of the ∼i is an equivalence relation, so is ∼. The frame F can then be viewed as the union of
equivalence classes of the relation ∼, which we call clusters. Clusters containing more than a single
point are sub-frames in which property I clearly does not hold; in general a cluster may be infinite
in size.
If we want to construct an EDI frame that maps to a particular ED frame by a p-morphism,
one way is to replace every cluster of the ED frame with a sub-frame that is EDI but that can still
be mapped into the cluster. Figure 2 depicts the relatively simple case of an equivalence frame F
composed by three points a, b, c connected by all the relations: ∼1,∼2, in this case; F clearly is
ED but not EI2. The frame F ′ on the right of the figure is an EDI frame; the names of its points
represent the targets of the p-morphism from F ′ onto F . So, for example the top left point of F ′
is mapped onto a of F ; the relations are mapped in the intuitive way. It is an easy exercise to
show that F is indeed a p-morphic image of F ′ and will therefore validate every formula which is
valid on F ′.
The aim of the following is to define precisely how to build, given any ED frame, a new EDI
frame in which every cluster is “unpacked” into an appropriate similar structure and to define the
relations appropriately.
In order to achieve the above, we present two set theoretic results. In Lemma 3.5 we show that
every infinite set X can be seen as the image of a product Xm under a function p. Intuitively this
lemma will be used by taking the set X as one of the clusters of an EDI frame F , the function
2 The relations are supposed to be the reflective transitive closure of the the ones depicted in the figure.
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p as the p-morphism and the product Xm (where m is the number of relations on the frame) as
the sub-frame that will replace the cluster in the new frame F ′. Lemma 3.6 extends the result of
Lemma 3.5 to guarantee that even if the clusters differ in size it is always possible to find a single
sub-frame that can replace each of them.
We assume m to be a natural number, such that m ≥ 2.
Lemma 3.5 Given any infinite set X, there exists a function p : Xm → X such that for
all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and for all u, xi ∈ X, there are x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xm ∈ X, such that
p(x1, . . . , xm) = u.
Proof Consider the set T = {τx,y | x, y ∈ X} of the transpositions of X, i.e. functions τx,y :
X → X ; where x, y ∈ X, such that if z = x then τx,y(z) = y, if z = y then τx,y(z) = x, and
τx,y(z) = z otherwise. We have |X | ≤ |T | ≤ |X × X |. But by set theory ([Lan84] page 701 for
example) |X | = |X ×X |, and so |X | = |T |. So, by induction, we have |Xm−1| = |X | = |T |. Call
f the bijection f : Xm−1 → T , and define p(x1, . . . , xm) = f(x1, . . . , xm−1)(xm). To prove the
lemma holds we consider two cases: i 6= m and i = m.
For i 6= m, assume any u ∈ X, and any xi ∈ X. Take any xj for j ∈ {1 . . .m − 1} \
{i}. Then f(x1, . . . , xm−1) is a transposition of X. So, there exists an xm ∈ X such that
f(x1, . . . , xm−1)(xm) = u. So p(x1, . . . , xm) = u.
For i = m, assume again any u ∈ X, and any xm ∈ X. Consider the transposition τxm,u; we
have τxm,u(xm) = u. But τxm,u = f(x1, . . . , xm−1) for some x1, . . . , xm−1 ∈ X. So p(x1, . . . , xm) =
u. ✷
Lemma 3.5 induces a similar result for mappings from Xm to sets whose cardinality is smaller
than X .
Lemma 3.6 Given any infinite set X, and a set C 6= ∅, such that |C| ≤ |X |, there exists a
function p : Xm → C such that the following holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}: for all xi ∈ X,u ∈ C,
there exist x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xm ∈ X, such that p(x1, . . . , xm) = u.
Proof Consider a set T such that C ∪ T and X have the same cardinality, and let g be a
bijection from X to (C ∪ T ). Then there is a function p′ : (C ∪ T )m → (C ∪ T ), satisfying the
property expressed by Lemma 3.5. Define now a function p′′ : (C ∪ T ) → C, such that p′′(x) =
x if x ∈ C, otherwise p′′(x) = c, where c is any element in C. Define the function p : Xm → C
by p(x1, . . . , xm) = p
′′(p′(g(x1), . . . , g(xm))). We claim p has the property required. For, let i ∈
{1, . . . ,m} and take any xi ∈ X and u ∈ C. Then g(xi) ∈ (C∪T ), and so by Lemma 3.5 there exist
c1, . . . , ci−1, ci+1, . . . , cm ∈ C ∪ T , such that p′(c1, . . . , ci−1, g(xi), ci+1, . . . , cm) = u. Define xj =
g−1(cj) for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} \ {i}. We then have p(x1, . . . , xm) = p′′(p′(c1, . . . , ci−1, g(xi), ci+1, . . . ,
cm)) = p
′′(u) = u since u ∈ C. ✷
We rely on the two results above to define a function p that maps tuples 〈c, x1, . . . , xm〉 into
c, where c is a cluster and xi ∈ X , for some appropriate set X . The function p is defined as in
Lemma 3.6 but it has an extra component for the cluster.
Corollary 3.1 Let C be a set of nonempty subsets of a set W . Then there exists a set X and a
function p : C ×Xm →W such that
1. for all tuples 〈c, x1, . . . , xm〉 we have p(〈c, x1, . . . , xm〉) ∈ c, and
2. for all c ∈ C, for all u ∈ c, for all i = 1 . . .m, and for all xi ∈ X, for each j ∈ {1 . . .m} \ {i}
there exists xj ∈ X, such that p(〈c, x1 . . . xm〉) = u.
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Proof Let X be an infinite set with cardinality at least as great as the cardinality of any c ∈ C.
This can be constructed by taking the union of these sets c ∈ C or by considering the set of the
natural numbers X = N if all the sets c ∈ C are finite. For each c ∈ C, let pc : Xm → c be the
function promised by Lemma 3.6. Define p : C ×Xm → W by p(c, x1, . . . , xm) = pc(x1, . . . , xm).
It is immediate that this function has the required property. ✷
Theorem 3.3 Given any ED frame F , there exists an EDI frame F ′, and a p-morphism p, such
that p(F ′) = F .
Proof Let F = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼m〉 be a frame with m relations on its support set W . Write ∼ for
the relation
⋂
i=1...m ∼i. Since each of the ∼i is an equivalence relation, so is ∼. Since the set of
worlds W of the frame F is non-empty, it can be viewed as the union of the equivalence classes of
the relation ∼, which we call clusters. Write C for the set of clusters of F . Consider the infinite
set X and a function p as described in Corollary 3.1, and define the frame F ′ = (W ′,∼′1, . . . ,∼
′
m〉
as follows:
• W ′ = C ×Xm,
• 〈c, x1, . . . , xm〉 ∼′i 〈d, y1, . . . , ym〉 if xi = yi and there exist worlds u ∈ c and v ∈ d such that
u ∼i v.
We can prove that:
1. The frame F ′ is EDI.
Proof a) F ′ is clearly an equivalence frame.
b) We prove F ′ satisfies property I. Write ∼′ for
⋂
i=1...m ∼
′
i. Suppose 〈c, x1, . . . , xm〉 ∼
′
〈d, y1, . . . , ym〉. Then for all i = 1 . . .m we have that xi = yi, and there exist ui ∈ c and
vi ∈ d such that ui ∼i vi. Since c and d are equivalence classes of ∼, it follows from the
latter that u1 ∼ v1, and consequently that c = d. Thus, 〈c, x1, . . . , xm〉 = 〈d, y1, . . . , ym〉.
c) We prove F ′ satisfies property D. Consider m tuples 〈c1, x11, . . . , x
1
m〉, . . . , 〈cm, x
m
1 , . . . , x
m
m〉
in W ′. For each i = i . . .m let ui be a world in cluster ci. Since F has property D, there
exists a world w such that w ∼i ui for each i = 1 . . .m. Let c be the cluster containing w.
Then, by construction, for each i = 1 . . .m we have 〈c, x11, . . . , x
m
m〉 ∼
′
i 〈ci, x
i
1, . . . , x
i
m〉. ✷
2. The function p is a p-morphism from F ′ to F .
Proof That the function p is surjective follows from property (2) of Corollary 3.1.
Next, we show that p is a frame homomorphism. Consider two tuples 〈c, x1, . . . , xm〉,
〈d, y1, . . . , ym〉 in W ′ such that 〈c, x1, . . . , xm〉 ∼′i 〈d, y1, . . . , ym〉. Then there exists u ∈ c and
v ∈ d such that u ∼i v. By property (1) of Corollary 3.1, we have p(〈c, x1, . . . , xm〉) ∼i u and
p(〈d, y1, . . . , ym〉) ∼i v. Since ∼i is an equivalence relation, it follows that p(〈c, x1, . . . , xm〉)
∼i p(〈d, y1, . . . , ym〉).
To show the backward simulation property, consider a tuple x = 〈c, x1, . . . , xm〉, and assume
p(x) ∼i w for some world w of F . Let d be the cluster containing w. By Corollary 3.1(2),
there exist yj for j 6= i such that if y = 〈d, y1, . . . yi−1, xi, yi+1, . . . ym〉, then p(y) = w. Since
p(x) ∈ c by Corollary 3.1(1), it is immediate that x ∼′i y. ✷
✷
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2. Since we confine our attention in this paper to the
language Ln, this result, together with Theorem 3.1, shows that the set of valid formulae for the
class of full frames is the same as that for the class of hypercubes. Both sets of valid formulae are
equal to the set of formulae valid on ED frames. We now set about attempting to axiomatize the
latter. It turns out to be necessary to introduce one more class of frames in order to achieve this.
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3.2 Weakly directed frames
In order to axiomatize the class of ED frames, we need to introduce one more class of frames. The
reason for this is that the directedness property does not naturally correspond to any formula of
Ln.
Lemma 3.7 No modal formula corresponds to n-directedness.
Proof Suppose the opposite and assume there is a formula φ that corresponds to n-directedness.
Consider two disjoint frames, F = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼n) and F ′ = (W ′,∼′1, . . . ,∼
′
n), whereW∩W
′ = ∅,
such that both F and F ′ are n-directed. the frame F ∪ F ′ = (W ∪W ′,∼1 ∪ ∼′1, . . . ,∼n ∪ ∼
′
n).
Since by assumption F |= φ and F ′ |= φ, it follows that F ∪ F ′ |= φ. (This is because satisfaction
of a formula of Ln at a world w depends only on worlds connected to w (Theorem 2.4). But, then
φ is valid on a frame which This is the opposite of what we assumed at the beginning. ✷
The problem here is rather superficial however. Any class of frames corresponding to a modal
formula should be closed under disjoint unions. To address this problem, we define a slight
weakening of the notion of directedness. We will show that the class of frames satisfying this
weaker notion validates the same class of formulae.
Definition 3.1 (Weak directedness) A frame F = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼n) is weakly directed when
for all worlds w0, w1, . . . , wn ∈ W , if for each i = 1, . . . , n there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
w0 ∼j wi, then there exists a world w such that wi ∼i w for each i = 1, . . . , n.
That is, weak directness is like directedness in requiring the existence of a world w such that
wi ∼i w for each i = 1, . . . , n, but it does so only under the condition that the worlds wi are
each connected to some world through a single step through one of the relations ∼j . We use the
notation “WD” to refer to the property of weak directedness. Thus, we write, e.g., FEWD for
the class of weakly directed equivalence frames. Clearly, every directed frame is weakly directed.
Moreover, the class of weakly directed frames is easily seen to be closed under disjoint unions.
Indeed, this class of frames turns out to be the smallest class of frames containing the directed
frames that is closed under disjoint unions. We first note the following.
Lemma 3.8 Every weakly-directed and connected equivalence frame is directed.
Proof Suppose that F = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼n) is weakly directed and connected. Let w1, . . . , wn be
any n worlds in W . We show that there exists a world w such that wi ∼i w for each i = 1, . . . , n.
Since F is connected, the worlds w1, . . . , wn are in the same connected component, and hence all
connected to some world w′. Since F is an equivalence frame the relations ∼i are symmetric, so we
may assume that for each i there exists a path directed from w′ to wi. We now claim that none of
these paths need to be any longer than one step, for if so, we can reduce their length. For, suppose
without loss of generality that the path from w′ to w1 involves more than one step. Write this path
as w′ ∼i1 u ∼j1 v . . . w1 and write the remaining paths as w
′ ∼i2 w
′
2 . . . w2 to w
′ ∼in w
′
n . . . wn.
Using weak directedness (and an ordering of the worlds u,w′2 . . . w
′
n such that u occurs in position
j1), we obtain a world w
′′ such that u ∼j1 w
′′ and for each k 6= 1 we have w′k ∼jk w
′′ for some jk.
By symmetry of the relations, we obtain paths from w′′ to the worlds wi. For k 6= 1 these paths are
of the form w′′ ∼jk w
′
k . . . wk and have the same length as the path connecting w
′ to wk. For k = 1
we have the path w′′ ∼j1 u ∼j1 v . . . w1, which can be shortened to w
′′ ∼j1 v . . . w1 by transitivity
of ∼j1 . This argument establishes that there exists a world w
′ such that for each i = 1, . . . , n we
have w′ ∼j wi for some j. Since F is weakly directed, it follows that there exists a world w such
that wi ∼i w for each i = 1, . . . , n. ✷
We obtain two consequences of this result. First, the characterization of the weakly directed
frames claimed above.
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Corollary 3.2 The class of weakly directed equivalence frames is the smallest class of equivalence
directed frames that is closed under arbitrary disjoint unions and isomorphism.
Proof It is immediate from the definition that the class of weakly directed equivalence frames
contains the ED frames and is closed under disjoint unions and isomorphism. To show that it
is the smallest such class, we show that any weakly directed equivalence frame is isomorphic to a
disjoint union of directed equivalence frames. For let F be weakly directed, and let W ′ be a subset
of the set of worlds of F containing exactly one world from each connected component of F . For
each w ∈ W let Fw denote the connected component of F containing w. By Lemma 3.8, each Fw
is directed. It is then possible to show that F is isomorphic to the disjoint union of the frames Fw
as w ranges over W ′.
✷
The second consequence of Lemma 3.8 is the fact that the formulae of Ln validated by the
weakly equivalence directed frames is the same as the set validated by the ED frames.
Corollary 3.3 FEWD ≡Ln FED
Proof Since every ED frame is EWD, every formula valid on the EWD frames is valid on the
ED frames. Conversely, suppose that φ ∈ Ln is not valid on some EWD frame F . Then there
exists a valuation π and a world w such that M |=w ¬φ, where M = (F, π). Let Mw be the
connected component of M containing w and Fw the corresponding frame. Then Mw is a directed
equivalence model, and by Theorem 2.4 we have Mw |=w ¬φ. Consequently, φ is not valid on the
ED frame Fw. ✷
This result, together with the results of the preceding sections, enables us to focus, in our
quest for an axiomatization of the full systems and hypercubes, on the class of weakly directed
equivalence frames.
4 Axiomatization
We are now ready to present an axiomatization of the full systems and hypercubes with respect
to Ln. The basis for the axiomatization will be the property of weak directedness identified in the
previous section.
For convenience, we first introduce some notation and terminology. We will write Sφ for the
formula
∨
i=1,...,n✸iφ. Note that M |=w Sφ if there exists a world w
′ such that M |=w′ φ and
w ∼i w′ for some i. Intuitively, Sφ asserts that at least one of the agents 1, . . . , n considers φ
possible.
For each i = 1, . . . , n, we also define a formula to be i-local if it is a boolean combination of
formulae of the form ✷iφ. Intuitively, an i-local formula expresses a property of agent i’s state of
knowledge. More precisely, we have the following fact, which may be proved by a straightforward
induction.
Lemma 4.1 Let φ be an i-local formula in Ln, let M be an equivalence model on n agents, and
let w and w′ be two worlds of M with w ∼i w′. Then M |=w φ if and only if M |=w′ φ.
We analyze extensions of S5n with respect to the axiom schema:

 ∧
i=1,...,n
Sφi

⇒ SS

 ∧
i=1,...,n
φi

 WD
where each φi is required to be an i-local formula. There is a close relationship between this axiom,
the property of weak directedness and the property defining full systems. Intuitively, the axiom
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states that if there are n worlds (each reachable in a single step from the present world), such that
the i-th world is one in which agent i is in a state of knowledge described by φi, then there exist
a single world (reachable in two steps from the present) that realizes these n states of knowledge.
This intuitive relationship may be made precise by the following correspondence result:
Lemma 4.2 For equivalence frames F , we have F |=WD if and only if F is weakly-directed.
Proof We first show that if F is a WD frame then F |= WD. For, suppose that π is an
interpretation of F and w0 a world of F such that (F, π) |=w0 (
∧
i=1,...,n Sφi). Then for each
i = 1, . . . , n there exists a world wi such that w0 ∼ji wi for some ji and (F, π) |=wi φi. Since F
is weakly directed there exists a world w such that wi ∼i w for each i = 1, . . . , n. By Lemma 4.1,
we have (F, π) |=w
∧
i=1,...,n φi. Since w0 ∼j1 w1 ∼1 w, it follows that (F, π) |=w0 SS
∧
i=1,...,n φi.
This establishes F |=WD.
Conversely, suppose F |= WD. We show that F is weakly directed. Let w0, w1, . . . , wn be
worlds of F such that for each i = 1, . . . , n there exists ji such that w0 ∼ji wi. We need to show
that there exists a world w such that wi ∼i w for each i = 1, . . . , n. To achieve this, let p1, . . . , pn
be n distinct propositions and define the interpretation π by pi ∈ π(w) if and only if w ∼i wi,
for each i = 1, . . . , n. (The interpretation π may be defined arbitrarily on all other propositions.)
Note that we have (F, π) |=w0
∧
i=1,...,n S✷ipi. Since F |= WD, and each formula ✷ipi is i-
local, it follows that (F, π) |=w0 SS
∧
i=1,...,n✷ipi. In particular, there exists a world w such that
(F, π) |=w
∧
i=1,...,n✷ipi, hence (F, π) |=w
∧
i=1,...,n pi. But, by definition of π, this means that
wi ∼i w for each i = 1, . . . , n, as required. ✷
The correspondence result above strongly indicates that the axiom WD can serve as a basis
for an axiomatization of the weakly directed equivalence frames. We now establish that this is
indeed the case. The proof will be by means of a standard technique for completeness proofs in
modal logic, namely the construction of a canonical model. We now briefly review this technique
to fix the notation, but refer the reader to [Che80, HC84] for details.
A logic L consists of a derivability relation ⊢L typically defined inductively using a basis of a
set of axioms and closing under a set of inference rules. Given a logic L, a set of formulae Γ is
L-inconsistent if there are formulae α1, . . . , αm ∈ Γ, such that ⊢L ¬(α1, . . . , αm), and L-consistent
otherwise. A set of formulae Γ is maximal if for every α of the language either α ∈ Γ or ¬α ∈ Γ.
Under appropriate conditions, it is possible to prove that every L-consistent set admits a maximal
L-consistent extension.
Given a multi-modal logic L, the canonical model MLC = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, π) is a model for the
logic L, built as follows. The set W is made of all the maximal L-consistent sets of formulae, Ri is
a family of relations on W 2 defined by wRiw
′ if ∀α (✷iα ∈ w implies α ∈ w′). The interpretation
π for the atoms is defined as p ∈ π(w) if p ∈ w. For normal modal logics L that are “compact” in
the sense that all rules of inference have a finite number of antecedents, the canonical model has
the property that MLC |= φ if and only if ⊢L φ.
A logic L is sound with respect to a class of frames F if ⊢L φ implies F |= φ. A logic L is
complete with respect to a class of frames F if F |= φ implies ⊢L φ. Some logics are not only
described by the canonical model but also by the frame of the canonical model, called the canonical
frame. It can be proved that completeness of a logic L with respect to a class of frames F holds
if the frame of the canonical model is in F . Define the logic S5WDn to be the logic obtained
from S5n by adding the axiom WD. It is possible to prove its completeness with respect to EWD
frames.
Theorem 4.1 The logic S5WDn is sound and complete for Ln with respect to the class of EWD
frames.
Proof Soundness follows from what was proved in the first part of Lemma 4.2 and the fact that
all axioms and rules of S5n are sound for equivalence frames [HM90]. To prove completeness we
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use the canonical model technique. It is easy to show that the frame F S5WDnC = (W,R1, . . . , Rn)
of the canonical model for S5WDn is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive with respect to the n
relations. We prove it is also WD.
Suppose that w0, w1, . . . , wn are worlds of F
S5WDn
C such that w0Rjiwi, for i = 1, . . . , n. Con-
sider the set
Γ =
n⋃
i=1
{φ : ✷iφ ∈ wi}.
We show that Γ is S5WDn-consistent. It then follows by the maximal extension theorem that there
is a maximal S5WDn-consistent extension w, which satisfies wiRiw by construction. This will
establish that the frame is WD. To show Γ is S5WDn-consistent, we assume it is not S5WDn-
consistent and obtain a contradiction. It follows from the assumption that for each i = 1, . . . , n
there are formulae αi1, . . . , α
i
mi
, with ✷iα
j
1 ∈ wi for each j = 1 . . .mi, such that
⊢S5WDn ¬(α
1
1 ∧ · · · ∧ α
1
m1
∧ · · · ∧ αn1 ∧ · · · ∧ α
n
mn
)
Let us now call αi = ∧
mi
j=1α
i
j. Note that by S5n reasoning, we have ✷iαi ∈ wi. It follows that
✸ji✷iαi ∈ w0. (For else, ✷ji¬✷iαi ∈ w0, hence ¬✷iαi ∈ wi, contradicting consistency of wi.)
By propositional logic we obtain S✷iαi ∈ w0. Thus,
∧
i=1,...,n S✷iαi ∈ w0. Now the formulae
✷iαi are i-local, so using WD it follows that SS(
∧
i=1,...,n✷iαi) ∈ w0. By S5n reasoning we get
SS(
∧
i=1,...,n αi) ∈ w0. But by S5n reasoning and the fact that ⊢S5WDn ¬
∧
i=1,...,n αi this leads to
the conclusion that w0 is inconsistent. This is the contradiction promised. ✷
Applying the equivalences with respect to Ln established previously, we also obtain soundness
and completeness with respect to several other semantics.
Corollary 4.1 The logic S5WDn is sound and complete for Ln with respect to
1. the class of full systems
2. the class of hypercube systems
3. the class of EDI frames
4. the class of ED frames
With Corollary 4.1 we have the axiomatization of full systems and hypercubes systems that
we aimed for. We remark that it can be shown that several other axioms could be used for this
result instead of WD. For example, an analysis of the proofs of both the correspondence and
completeness results reveals that the axiom

 ∧
i=1,...,n
S✷iφi

⇒ SS

 ∧
i=1,...,n
✷iφi


(where the φi are not required to be i-local) also suffices. This is not surprising, since for any
i-local formula φ it can be shown that φ⇔ ✷iφ is S5n-valid.
While the axiomWD is compact when expressed using the operator S, it is quite lengthy when
expanded and involves considerable use of disjunction. It is possible to show that WD may be
replaced by certain other axioms which are less symmetrical, but which state interactions between
the agents’ knowledge of a syntactically simpler form than the expansion ofWD. For a discussion
of a number of alternative axioms that can be shown to be equivalent to WD, we refer the reader
to the thesis of Lomuscio [Lom99]. One such alternative, for the case n = 2, has appeared in the
literature before, as the axiom
✸1✷2p⇒ ✷2✸1p
due to Catach [Cat88], also discussed in [Pop94].
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Theorem 4.2 WD in the case n = 2 is S52-equivalent to Catach’s axiom.
Proof If n = 2 then WD is
(✸1φ1 ∨✸2φ1) ∧ (✸1φ2 ∨✸2φ2)⇒
∨
i,j∈{1,2}
✸i✸j(φ1 ∧ φ2)
(with φi i-local).
WD to Catach: Put φ1 = ✷1¬p and φ2 = ✷2p (note that these are 1-local and 2-local respec-
tively). WD now becomes
(✸1✷1¬p ∨✸2✷1¬p) ∧ (✸1✷2p ∨✸2✷2p)⇒ ⊥.
Now we drop the disjuncts ✸1✷1¬p and ✸2✷2p (this strengthens the antecedent and hence weakens
the whole formula) to obtain as a consequence
✸2✷1¬p ∧✸1✷2p⇒ ⊥,
which can be simply rearranged to obtain ✸1✷2p⇒ ✷2✸1p as required.
Catach to WD: From ✸1✷2p⇒ ✷2✸1p we want to obtain
(✸1φ1 ∨✸2φ1) ∧ (✸1φ2 ∨✸2φ2)⇒
∨
i,j∈{1,2}
✸i✸j(φ1 ∧ φ2)
in the case that the φi are i-local. Since the φi are i-local, we have ✷iφi ⇔ φi. Assume
(✸1✷1φ1 ∨✸2✷1φ1) ∧ (✸1✷2φ2 ∨✸2✷2φ2)
which, on distribution, is
(✸1✷1φ1 ∧✸1✷2φ2) ∨ (✸1✷1φ1 ∧✸2✷2φ2) ∨ (✸2✷1φ1 ∧✸1✷2φ2) ∨ (✸2✷1φ1 ∧✸2✷2φ2)
From each of these disjuncts, we will derive either ✸1✸2(φ1 ∧ φ2) or ✸2✸1(φ1 ∧φ2), thus proving
WD. The derivations are as follows:
1. From (✸1✷1φ1 ∧ ✸1✷2φ2), apply Catach’s axiom together with uniform substitution to the
second term to obtain (✸1✷1φ1 ∧ ✷2✸1φ2). Use the S5n axioms ✸1✷1ψ ⇔ ✷1ψ and
✷2✸1ψ ⇒ ✸1ψ to obtain ✷1φ1 ∧ ✸1φ2. From this we deduce ✸1(φ1 ∧ φ2) and from the
axiom T: p⇒ ✸2p and substitution we obtain ✸2✸1(φ1 ∧ φ2).
2. From (✸1✷1φ1∧✸2✷2φ2): the first conjunct gives ✷1φ1, then φ1, then ✸2φ1 by S5n axioms.
The second conjunct gives ✷2φ2, so putting them together we have ✸2φ1 ∧✷2φ2, from which
we obtain ✸2(φ1 ∧ φ2) as a consequence, and hence ✸1✸2(φ1 ∧ φ2).
3. From (✸2✷1φ1∧✸1✷2φ2), we obtain ✷1✸2φ1∧✸1✷2φ2 by applying Catach to the first term.
This now implies ✸1(✸2φ1 ∧ ✷2φ2), which in turn implies ✸1✸2(φ1 ∧ φ2).
4. From (✸2✷1φ1 ∧✸2✷2φ2): this case is similar to the first one.
✷
5 Decidability
We now prove that the logic S5WDn is decidable. In order to do that we prove that the logic has
the finite model property.
Definition 5.1 A logic L is said to have the finite model property (or fmp in short) if for any
formula φ, 6⊢L φ implies that there is a finite model M for L such that M 6|= φ.
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A logic can be proved to have the fmp in a number of different ways: algebraically as in
[McK41], [Ber49], by the use of a “mini-canonical” model as in [HC96], etc. Here we use the
another standard technique which is better suited for this case: filtrations (first presented in
[Lem77]).
The idea of filtrations is the following. If a logic is complete, we know that if a formula φ is a
non-theorem of L (i.e. if ¬φ is L-consistent), then φ is invalid on some model M for L. The model
M might be infinite. Filtrations enable us to produce a model M ′ from M , such that M ′ is finite.
If we can further prove that M ′ is also a model for L, then we have proved that the logic L has
the finite model property.
We formally proceed as follows. Given a formula φ, define the set Φφ to be the set of formulae
α that are either a sub-formula of φ or the negation of a sub-formula of φ. The set Φφ is obviously
finite for any formula φ.
Definition 5.2 Let M be a model. Two worlds w,w′ of M are equivalent with respect to Φφ
(denoted w ≡Φφ w
′, or simply w ≡ w′ if it is not ambiguous), if for every α ∈ Φφ, we have
M |=w α if and only if M |=w′ α.
We can now define filtrations as follows.
Definition 5.3 Given a formula φ and a model M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, π), a filtration through Φφ
is a model M ′ = (W ′, R′1, . . . , R
′
n, π
′) satisfying the following three properties:
• W ′ =W/≡Φφ , where ≡Φφ is the equivalence relation defined as in 5.2.
• For each i ∈ A, the relation R′i is suitable, i.e. it satisfies the two properties:
1. For all [w1], [w2] ∈ W ′, if there exists u ∈ W such that w1Riu and u ≡ w2, then
[w1]R
′
i[w2].
2. For all [w1], [w2] ∈ W
′, if [w1]R
′
i[w2] then for all formulae α such that ✷iα ∈ Φφ, if
M |=w1 ✷iα then M |=w2 α.
• For any p ∈ Atoms, p ∈ π′([w]) if and only if p ∈ π(w).
Note that a model M ′ satisfying these conditions must be finite since Φφ is finite, so the number
of equivalence classes under ≡Φφ is finite. Indeed, the number of worlds in M
′ is at most 2|φ|,
It can be proved by induction (see for example [HC84] page 139) that suitability of the relations
R′i guarantees the validity of the following:
Theorem 5.1 Given a model M , and any formula φ, a filtration M ′ of M through Φφ has the
property that for any point w ∈ W and and for any formula α ∈ Φ, we have M ′ |=[w] α if and
only if M |=w α
We now proceed to the case of interest here: the logic S5WDn. Consider the canonical model
M for S5WDn. We know (see Theorem 4.1) that M is a weakly directed equivalence model. By
Lemma 3.8, the model generated by any point of M is directed. Consider any formula φ. We
consider the model M ′ defined as follows:
Definition 5.4 Given a model M and a formula φ define the model M ′ = (W ′,∼′1, . . . ,∼
′
n, π
′)
by
• W ′ =W/≡Φφ , where ≡Φφ is the equivalence relation defined by Definition 5.2.
• [w1] ∼′i [w2] if for all formulae α such that ✷iα ∈ Φφ, we have M |=w1 ✷iα if and only if
M |=w2 ✷iα.
• For any p ∈ Atoms, we have p ∈ π′([w]) if and only if p ∈ π(w).
Indeed the model M ′ defined by Definition 5.4 is a filtration as the following shows (stated in
[HC84] page 145 for the mono-modal case).
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Lemma 5.1 Given an equivalence model M and a formula φ, the model M ′ as described in
Definition 5.4 is a filtration of M through Φφ.
Proof All we need to prove is that the relations ∼′i are suitable.
Property 1. Consider worlds [w1], [w2] ∈ W ′ and world u ∈ W such that w1 ∼i u and u ≡ w2.
We need to prove that [w1] ∼′i [w2], i.e. that for all formulae α such that ✷iα ∈ Φφwe have
M |=w1 ✷iα if and only if M |=w2 ✷iα. We prove it from left to right; the other direction is
similar. Note that M |=w1 ✷iα if and only if M |=w1 ✷i✷iα because M is an equivalence model;
but w1 ∼i u and so M |=u ✷iα. But ✷iα ∈ Φ and w2 ≡ u, so M |=w2 ✷iα, which is what we
wanted to prove.
Property 2. Consider worlds [w1], [w2] ∈ W ′ such that [w1] ∼′i [w2]. This means that for all
✷iα ∈ Φ, we have M |=w1 ✷iα if and only if M |=w2 ✷iα. Since M is an equivalence model it
follows that M |=w2 α. ✷
We now prove that the filtration defined above produces models for S5WDn. We first consider
the effect of the filtration on directed models.
Lemma 5.2 If M is an equivalence directed model, then the model M ′ defined in Definition 5.4,
is also an equivalence directed model.
Proof We prove that F ′ = (W ′,∼1, . . . ,∼′n) is an ED frame. The relations ∼
′
i are clearly
equivalence relations. All it remains to show is that F ′ is directed. To do that, consider any
[w1], . . . , [wn] ∈ W ′. Since M is directed, there exists w ∈ W such that wi ∼i w for i = 1, . . . , n.
But each ∼′i is suitable and so, by a consequence of property 1 of suitability we have that [wi] ∼
′
i [w],
for i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore the frame F ′ is directed. ✷
We are finally in the position to prove fmp.
Theorem 5.2 The logic S5WDn has the finite model property. Indeed, every formula φ with a
countermodel has a countermodel with at most 2|φ| worlds.
Proof Suppose 6⊢ φ. Since by the proof of Theorem 4.1 the logic S5WDn is canonical, the canon-
ical model M = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼n, π) for S5WDn is an equivalence model, it is weakly-directed and
there is a point w ∈ W , such that M |=w ¬φ. Consider the model Mw generated by w. By
Theorem 2.4, we have Mw |=w ¬φ. The model Mw is clearly an equivalence model and, since it
is connected it is also directed, by Lemma 3.8. Consider now the filtration M ′ of Mw through Φφ
according to Definition 5.4; by Lemma 5.2, M ′ is an equivalence directed model and it is finite by
construction because Φφ is a finite set. But M
′ is a filtration, and by Theorem 5.1, M ′ |=[w] ¬φ,
which is what we needed to prove. The bound on the size of M ′ follows from the observation above.
✷
Corollary 5.1 The logic S5WDn is decidable.
Proof By Theorem 5.2, to check that φ is valid, it suffices suffices to check that φ has no coun-
termodel with at most 2|φ| worlds. ✷
Theorem 5.2 is similar to a known result [HM92] for the logic S5n, for which an exponential
size countermodel also exists for every formula with a countermodel. (In the case of S5, there
exists a linear size model [LR77]). We will leave open the exact complexity of S5WDn, but note
that whereas the logic S5 is NP-complete [LR77], the logic S5n is known to be PSPACE-complete
[HM92]. The upper bound for S5 is direct from the existence of a linear size model, but it can
be shown that, in a precise sense, this technique does not work for S5n. Instead, the proof of the
upper bound in the case of S5n is by means of a tableau construction. We will not attempt here
to develop a similar construction for S5WDn.
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6 Homogeneous broadcast systems
Hypercubes were motivated above as an appropriate model for the initial configuration of a multi-
agent system, in which all agents are ignorant of each other’s local state. In this section we
will show that for a particular class of systems, homogeneous broadcast systems with perfect
recall, hypercubes are also an appropriate model of the states of knowledge of agents that acquire
information over time. In this class of systems, all communication is by synchronous broadcast,
agents have perfect recall, and the agents’ knowledge in the initial configuration is characterized by
a hypercube system. We establish that in such systems, the agents’ knowledge can be characterized
by a hypercube system not just at the initial time, but also at all subsequent times. It follows
from this result that the logic of knowledge in homogeneous broadcast systems can be axiomatized
by the logic S5WDn studied in the previous section. Thus, the applicability of hypercubes as a
model of agents’ knowledge extends beyond initial configurations.
This section is organized as follows. In Section 6.1 we describe environments, a general model
for the behavior of agents and their interaction. This model may be used in a variety of ways to
ascribe a state of knowledge to the agents after a particular sequence of events has occurred. We
focus here on just one of the possibilities, in which it is assumed that agents have perfect recall
of their observations. In Section 6.2, we define broadcast environments, a special case of this
general model that constrains all communication between agents to be by synchronous broadcast.
Section 6.3 considers the special case of homogeneous broadcast environments, establishes the
connection between the systems generated by these environments and hypercubes.
6.1 Environments
In the model of Halpern and Moses [HM90], a distributed system corresponds to a set of runs, where
each run constitutes a history that identifies at each point of time a state of the environment and a
local state for each agent. This model is perhaps overly general, since in practice one is interested
in the particular sets of runs that are generated by executing a given program, or protocol, within a
given communication architecture. A formal framework to capture this idea, contexts, was defined
by Fagin et al. [FHMV97, FHMV95]. In this section we briefly recall a variant of this framework,
environments, from [Mey96b]. (We refer the reader to [Mey96b, FHMV95] for more extensive
motivation and examples.) Compared to contexts, environments admit an additional degree of
freedom by allowing knowledge to be interpreted in different ways in the same set of runs. We
focus here on a particular interpretation, based on the assumption that agents have perfect recall.
We describe how executing a protocol in an environment with respect to an interpretation of
knowledge determines a Kripke structure that ascribes a state of knowledge to the agents after
the occurrence of a particular sequence of events. In Section 6.2, we will present a special case
of this model that defines a particular architecture in which agents communicate by synchronous
broadcast.
For the definition of environment, we assume a set A = {0, 1, . . . , n} of agents. We also assume
that for each agent i ∈ A, there is a non-empty set ACT i, representing the set of actions that may
be performed by agent i. A joint action is defined to be a tuple 〈a0, . . . , an〉 ∈ ACT 0×· · ·×ACTn.
We write ACT for the set of joint actions. As before, we assume a set Atoms of propositional
variables of the language.
In the following definitions, agent 0 will play a role somewhat different from the other agents.
Intuitively, it is intended that agent 0 be used to model aspects of the context, or communication
architecture, within which the other agents operate. The actions of agent 0 correspond to nonde-
terministic behavior of this context. In applications of the framework, the architecture is typically
fixed, and one is interested in designing programs for the behavior of agents 1 . . . n.
Definition 6.1 (Environment) An interpreted environment is a tuple of the form E = 〈S, I, P0,
τ, O, V 〉 where the components are defined as follows:
• S is a set of states of the environment. Intuitively, states of the environment may encode
such information as messages in transit, failure of components, etc.
21
• I is a subset of S, representing the possible initial states of the environment.
• P0 : S → P(ACT0) is a function, called the protocol of the environment, mapping states
to subsets of the set ACT 0 of actions performable by the environment. Intuitively, P0(s)
represents the set of actions that may be performed by the environment when the system is
in state s.
• τ is a function mapping joint actions j ∈ ACT to state transition functions τ(j) : S → S.
Intuitively, when the joint action j is performed in the state s, the resulting state of the
environment is τ(j)(s).
• O is a function from S to On for some set O. For each i = 1, . . . , n, the function Oi mapping
s ∈ S to the ith component of O(s), is called the observation function of agent i. Intuitively,
Oi(s) represents the observation of agent i in the state s.
• V : S × Atoms → {0, 1} is a valuation, assigning a truth value V (s, p) in each state s to
each atomic proposition p ∈ Atoms.
A trace of an environment E is a finite sequence s0 . . . sm of states such that s0 ∈ I and for
all k = 0 . . .m − 1 there exists a joint action j = 〈a0, a1, . . . , an〉 such that sk+1 = τ(j)(sk) and
a0 ∈ P0(sk). We write fin(r) for the final state of a trace r.
Intuitively, the traces of an environment correspond to the finite histories that may be obtained
from some behavior of the agents in that environment.3 Note that the nondeterministic choices
of action made by the environment itself are constrained by the protocol of the environment, and
that these choices are determined at each step from the state of the environment. On the other
hand, the notion of trace assumes that the choices of action of agents 1 . . . n are unconstrained. In
practice, we wish these agents to behave according to some program (perhaps nondeterministic),
that determines their choice of next possible action as some function of the observations that they
have made. The following definition captures this intuition.
Definition 6.2 (Perfect Recall) The perfect recall local state of agent i = 1 . . . n in a trace
r = s0 . . . sm, denoted {r}i, is defined to be the sequence Oi(s0) . . . Oi(sm) of observations made
by the agent in the trace.
A perfect recall protocol for agent i = 1 . . . n is a function Pi mapping each sequence of
observations in O∗ to a non-empty subset of ACT i. A joint perfect recall protocol is a tuple
P = 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉 consisting of a perfect recall protocol Pi for each agent i = 1 . . . n. We write Pi
for Pi when P is given.
Protocols specify the possible choices of next action of the agents, given a certain history of
events, as follows. For each agent i = 1 . . . n, we say that an action ai ∈ ACT i is enabled with
respect to a protocol P at a trace r of E if ai ∈ Pi({r}i). An action a0 of the environment is
enabled at r if a0 ∈ P0(fin(r)). A joint action is enabled at r with respect to a protocol P if each
of its components is enabled at r.
We obtain the traces that result when agents execute a joint protocol in an environment as
follows. Define a trace s0 . . . sm of E to be consistent with a joint protocol P if for each k < m,
there exists a joint action j enabled at s0 . . . sk with respect to P, such that τ(a)(sk) = sk+1. We
are now in a position to describe the frame that captures the agents’ states of knowledge when
they execute a protocol in an environment.
Definition 6.3 (Perfect recall frame derived from a protocol and environment) Given
an environment E and a joint protocol P, the perfect recall frame derived from E and P is
the structure FE,P = (W,∼1, . . . ,∼n), where:
3One could also define runs of the environment, which are infinite sequences of states satisfying the same
constraint on state transitions. This would correspond more closely to the framework of [FHMV95]. Runs are
essential when one is interested in languages containing temporal operators, but there is a precise sense in which it
suffices to work with traces when only modal operators for knowledge are of interest, as in the present paper. See
the appendix of [vdM98] for a discussion of this issue.
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• W is the set of all traces of E consistent with P,
• ∼i is the binary relation on W defined by r ∼i r
′ if {r}i = {r
′}i, for each agent i = 1 . . . n.
Intuitively, because W contains only traces of E consistent with P, this frame encodes the
assumption that it is common knowledge amongst the agents that the environment in which
they are operating is E and that the protocol they are running is P. Moreover, the accessibility
relations ∼i expressing agents’ knowledge are defined in a way that corresponds to assuming that
agents have perfect recall of their observations. The relations ∼i could have been defined in many
different ways: for example, it is meaningful to consider instead the relations ≈i defined by r ≈i r′
if Oi(fin(r)) = Oi(fin(r
′)). This would correspond to the assumption that agents are only aware
of their most recent observation. The assumption of perfect recall we work with in this paper is
frequently made in the literature because it amounts to assuming that agents make optimal use of
the information to which they are exposed. This assumption is essential for the derivation of lower
bounds and impossibility results and the synthesis of optimal protocols [HM90, MT88, HMW90].
6.2 Broadcast environments
In this subsection we define broadcast environments (BE), a special case of the formalism described
in Section 6.1. Broadcast environments model situations in which all communication is by syn-
chronous broadcast. Examples of this are systems in which agents communicate by means of a
shared bus, by writing tokens onto a shared blackboard [Nii86] and in face to face conversation.
Other examples are classical puzzles such as the wise men, or muddy children puzzle [MDH86],
and a variety of games of incomplete information, including battleships, Stratego and Bridge.
Broadcast environments have been considered previously in [Mey96a].
To define broadcast environments, we need to impose a number of constraints on the compo-
nents making up the definition of environments given in the previous section. We do so here in a
way that slightly simplifies the model in [Mey96a], eliminating some features that will be irrelevant
in the context of homogeneous broadcast environments. The intuition we wish to capture is that
each agent holds some private information, which is unobservable to all other agents. The actions
taken by the agents will have two types of effects: they will update this private information, and
simultaneously broadcast some information to all the other agents.
The actions performed by agents in broadcast environments have two components: an internal
component and an external component. The internal component of an agent’s action will affect
only the agent’s private state, and will be unobservable to the other agents. On the other hand,
the external component will be observable to all agents, but it will affect only the state of the
environment.
Assumption 6.1 (BE Actions) For each i = 0 . . . n there exists a set Ai of external actions and
a set Bi of internal actions. All the sets Ai contain the special “null” action ǫ. For i = 0 . . . n,
the set ACT i of actions of agent i consists of the pairs a · b where a ∈ Ai and b ∈ Bi.
The role of the null action is to allow for a uniform representation of initial states (see Assump-
tion 6.3 below). It follows from Assumption 6.1 and the definitions of the previous section that
the set of the joint actions ACT in a broadcast environment consists of the tuples of the form
j = 〈a0 · b0, a1 · b1, . . . , an · bn〉 where ai · bi ∈ ACT i for each i = 0 . . . n. We define a(j) to be the
component 〈a0, a1, a2, . . . , an〉, and call this the joint external component of j. We write A for
the set A0 × . . .×An of joint external actions.
To represent the private information held by agents, we assume that for each agent i = 0 . . . n
there exists a set Si of instantaneous private states. Intuitively, for i = 1 . . . n the states Si
represent the information observable by agent i only. In the case i = 0, the states S0 represent
that part of the environment’s state which is observable to no agent.
Assumption 6.2 (BE States) The set of states S of a broadcast environment is required to
consist of tuples of the form 〈a0, . . . , an; p0, . . . , pn〉, where for each i = 0 . . . n, the component
ai ∈ Ai is an external action of agent i and the component pi ∈ Si is a private state of agent i.
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Intuitively, a tuple 〈a0, . . . , an; p0, . . . , pn〉 models a situation in which each agent i is in the
instantaneous private state pi, and in which ai is the most recent external action performed by
agent i. We define the joint private state at s to be the tuple p(s) = 〈p0, . . . , pn〉, and agent i’s
private state at s, denoted pi(s), to be the private state pi. If s = 〈a0, . . . , an; p0, . . . , pn〉 is a
state then we define the joint external action at s, denoted a(s), to be the tuple 〈a0, . . . , an〉.
Clearly, in initial states it does not make sense to talk of a most recent external action. This
motivates the following.
Assumption 6.3 (BE initial states) The set of initial states I of a broadcast environment con-
tains only states 〈a0, . . . , an; p0, . . . , pn〉 with ai = ǫ for all i = 0 . . . n.
The definition of broadcast environment allows the set I of initial states to be any nonempty set of
states of this form. As we will see later, homogeneous broadcast environments restrict the possible
sets of initial states.
In a broadcast environment, agents are aware of their own private state, and also of the
external actions performed by all agents. All communication between agents will be by means of
the external actions. This constraint is model-led by the definition of the agents’ observations.
Assumption 6.4 (BE observations) For i = 1 . . . n, we require agent i’s observation function
Oi to be given by Oi(〈a0, . . . , an; p0, . . . , pn〉) = 〈a0, . . . , an; pi〉.
That is, in a given state, an agent’s observation consists of the external component of the joint
action producing that state, and the agent’s private state.4
It will be convenient in what follows to introduce an observation function for agent 0, sim-
ilarly defined by O0(〈a0, . . . , an; p0, . . . , pn〉) = 〈a0, . . . , an; p0〉. Moreover, we obtain using this
observation function an equivalence relation ∼0 on traces, defined exactly as the relations ∼i.
One of the effects of performing a joint action in a broadcast environment is that each agent
updates its private state in a way that depends on its internal action and the joint external action
simultaneously being performed. In addition to this, the joint external action will be recorded in
the resulting state.
Assumption 6.5 (BE transitions) For each agent i = 0 . . . n there exists a private action
interpretation function τi : A × Bi → (Si → Si). The joint action interpretation function
τ : ACT → (S → S) of a broadcast environment is obtained from the private action interpre-
tation functions as follows. For each joint action j = 〈a0 · b0, . . . , an · bn〉, the transition function
τ(j) maps a state s = 〈a′0, . . . , a
′
n; p0, . . . , pn〉 to
τ(j)(s) = 〈a0, . . . , an; τ0(a(j), b0)(p0), . . . , τn(a(j), bn)(pn)〉.
That is, for each joint external action a ∈ A and internal action bi ∈ Bi, the function τi(a, bi) :
Si → Si is a private state transition function, intuitively representing the effect on agent i’s private
states of performing the internal action bi when the joint external action a is being simultane-
ously performed. The state of the environment resulting from a joint action records the external
component of the joint action, and updates each agent’s private state using its private action
interpretation function.
Finally, we require that the protocol P0 of the environment depend only upon its private state
and the most recent external action.
Assumption 6.6 (BE protocol) If s and t are states with O0(s) = O0(t) then P0(s) = P0(t).
The propositional constants Atoms of a broadcast environment are allowed to describe any prop-
erty of the global states S, so we do not make any assumption on the valuation V .
We may now state the main definition of this section.
Definition 6.4 (Broadcast environment) A broadcast environment is an environment satis-
fying assumptions 6.1—6.6.
4 This is a slight simplification of the definition in [Mey96a], eliminating an extra component that is incompatible
with homogeneity.
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In broadcast environments, agents’ mutual knowledge can be shown to have a particularly simple
structure [Mey96a]. Intuitively, this is because broadcast communication maintains a high degree
of common knowledge. The following section provides an illustration of this point in a special case
of broadcast environments.
Example 6.1 We illustrate the definitions so far by means of a simple card game. Let us imagine
an initial situation set up as described in Example 2.1, and take n = 2. Thus each of the two players
has 12 cards from the respective deck. The game now proceeds as follows: at each move, provided
the hands are not empty, both players select a card from their hand, and place it face up on the
table, where it remains until the next move, when it is returned to its deck, so that it is no longer
visible. (Of course, a player with perfect recall will remember what cards have been played.) The
objective of the game does not concern us here (it may be to play a card with a value greater than
that picked by the opponent, for example). Note that the players play in parallel (synchronously).
We model this game as a broadcast system together with a joint protocol.
The private states of agent i ≥ 1 are now of the form h ⊂ D, where D is a deck and h is a set
of 12 or fewer cards. As in Example 2.1, we will consider two modelings for the private states of
agent 0. The first modeling, which we call the simple modeling, takes the states of the environment
to be the singleton set {1}. This is appropriate when we wish to analyze the players’ knowledge
about each other’s hands. If we also wish to consider the players’ knowledge about the cards in
the respective decks, then we use the rich modeling, in which we take agent 0’s private states to be
tuples 〈D1, D2, f1, f2〉, where Di ⊆ D represent the cards in the i-th deck, as before, and fi ⊂ D
contains at most one card, the card most recently placed face up by player i. (In the initial states,
we will have fi empty.)
In this example, the environment is passive, so we may take the actions of agent 0 to consist
of the single pair ǫ · ǫ only, and for each state s the environment’s protocol returns P0(s) = {ǫ · ǫ}.
All the actions of the remaining agents are observable, so we may take the set of internal actions
Bi to be {ǫ} in each case, and the set of external actions Ai to be equal to the set of subsets of D
with at most one element. Intuitively, c ∈ Ai corresponds to the action of playing the cards in c,
so an empty set represents the action of playing no card. Thus, the set of joint actions is the set
of tuples of the form
j = 〈ǫ · ǫ, c1 · ǫ, c2 · ǫ〉
where c1, c2 ∈ Ai, and the corresponding joint external action has the form a(j) = 〈ǫ, c1, c2〉.
Given the above, we also see that a state of the system is a tuple of the form
s =
〈
ǫ · ǫ, c1 · ǫ, c2 · ǫ; p0, h1, h2
〉
where, for i = 1, 2, we have that ci ⊂ D is a set of cards with at most one element, and hi
is a set of twelve or fewer cards. In the simple modeling we have p0 = 1; in the rich modeling
p0 = 〈D1, D2, f1, f2〉, where each set Di ⊆ D is a set of cards, and fi ⊆ D is a set of cards with at
most one element. (In the latter case, not all such states are reachable: for example, we will have
fi = ci in all reachable states.)
The observation of agent i = 1, 2 in a state of one of the above forms is Oi(s) = 〈ǫ, c1, c2;hi〉.
Note that we model observability of the card face up through the agent’s observation of the last
action, since agents are assumed incapable of observing the private state of agent 0 directly. If an
agent i = 1, 2 makes a sequence of observations σ, then its final observation will have hi equal to
its current hand. Thus, we may define the protocol of each agent, representing its choice of card
at each move, by Pi(σ) = {{c} | c ∈ hi} if hi is not empty, and Pi(σ) = {∅} otherwise.
Transitions are given as follows, for states and joint external actions as above. For agent 0,
we clearly have τ0(〈ǫ, c1, c2〉, ǫ)(1) = 1 in the simple modeling. In the rich modeling,
τ0(〈ǫ, c1, c2〉, ǫ)(〈D1, . . .D2, f1, f2〉) = 〈D1 ∪ f1, D2 ∪ f2, c1, c2〉.
For agent i = 1, 2, we take
τ0(〈ǫ, c1, c2〉, ǫ)(hi) = hi \ ci.
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The initial states of the system are the states
s =
〈
ǫ · ǫ, ∅ · ǫ, ∅ · ǫ; p0, h1, h2
〉
where for i = 1, 2 we have h1 and h2 equal to sets of exactly 12 cards. In the simple modeling,
we have p0 = 1, and, as noted in Example 2.1, this set of states forms a hypercube. In the rich
modeling, we have p0 = 〈D \ h1, D \ h2, ∅, ∅〉. As we noted previously, this set of states is a full
system, but not a hypercube.
In the sequel, we will make use of the following observation.
Lemma 6.1 Suppose E is a broadcast environment, and P is a joint perfect recall protocol. Let
r and r′ be traces of E consistent with P such that r ∼i r′, where i ∈ {0 . . . n}. Then every action
of agent i that is enabled at r is also enabled at r′.
The proof is immediate from the definitions. (In the case of agent 0, note that r ∼0 r′ implies
O0(r) = O0(r
′) and use Assumption 6.6.)
6.3 Homogeneous broadcast environments
Homogeneous broadcast environments are a special case of broadcast environments. These envi-
ronments satisfy the additional, and quite natural, constraint that agents start in a condition of
ignorance about each others states, and the state of the environment. Thus, their initial state of
knowledge is characterized by a hypercube system. We will show that, under the assumption that
agents have perfect recall, their knowledge can also be characterized as a hypercube system at all
subsequent times.
Definition 6.5 (Homogeneous broadcast environment) A broadcast environment E is ho-
mogeneous if there exists for each agent i = 0 . . . n a set Ii ⊆ Pi of initial private states, such that
the set of initial states I of the environment E is the set of all states 〈ǫ, . . . , ǫ; p0, . . . pn〉, where
pi ∈ Ii for i = 0 . . . n.
In other words, the set of initial states is isomorphic to the hypercube I0× . . .×In. That is, agents
are initially ignorant of each others’ states and the state of the environment. The environment in
Example 6.1 is a homogeneous broadcast system under the simple modeling (but not under the
rich modeling.) Of the other examples mentioned in the previous section, battleships and Stratego
satisfy this constraint, but the wise men puzzle, the muddy children puzzle and Bridge do not.
(For example, the initial configurations of Bridge, i.e. after cards have been dealt but before
bidding, do not form a hypercube because it is not possible for two players to simultaneously hold
the same card.)
We may now introduce the main object of study in this section.
Definition 6.6 (Perfect recall homogeneous broadcast frame) A perfect recall homogene-
ous broadcast frame is any frame FE,P obtained from a joint perfect recall protocol P in a homo-
geneous broadcast environment E.
We are now in a position to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 6.1 Every perfect recall homogeneous broadcast frame is isomorphic to a frame obtained
from a disjoint union of systems of the form X0 ×X1× . . .×Xn. In particular, every such frame
is weakly-directed.
This result establishes a close connection between perfect recall homogeneous broadcast frames
and hypercube systems. In particular, it follows that the logic S5WDn is sound for this class of
frames.
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For the proof, it is convenient to introduce the following notions. If r = s0s1 . . . sm is a trace
of a broadcast environment, we will write a(r) for the sequence a(s0) . . . a(sm) of joint external
actions performed in r. If s = 〈a0, . . . , an; p0, . . . , pn〉 and t = 〈a0, . . . , an; q0, . . . , qn〉 are global
states with the same joint external action component, and i ∈ {0 . . . n}, define s ⊲⊳i t to be the
state 〈a0, . . . , an; p0, . . . , pi−1, qi, pi+1, . . . , pn〉, that is like s except that agent i has the private
state it has in t.
Note that for j 6= i, we have Oj(s ⊲⊳i t) = 〈a0, . . . , an; pj〉 = Oj(s). Additionally, Oi(s ⊲⊳i
t) = 〈a0, . . . , an; qi〉 = Oi(t). More generally, if r1 = s0s1 . . . sm and r2 = t0t1 . . . tm are sequences
of states of the same length with a(r1) = a(r2) then we define r1 ⊲⊳i r2 to be the sequence
(s0 ⊲⊳i t0)(s1 ⊲⊳i t1) . . . (sm ⊲⊳i tm). The following result states a closure condition of the set of
traces of a homogeneous broadcast environment.
Lemma 6.2 Let E be a homogeneous broadcast environment, and P a joint perfect recall protocol.
If r1 and r2 are traces in FE,P with a(r1) = a(r2) then for any i we have that r1 ⊲⊳i r2 is a trace
in FE,P with (r1 ⊲⊳i r2) ∼i r2 and for j 6= i we have that (r1 ⊲⊳i r2) ∼j r1.
Proof Note that a(r) = a(r′) implies that r and r′ have the same length. It is immediate from
the comments above that (r1 ⊲⊳i r2) ∼j r1 for j 6= i and (r1 ⊲⊳i r2) ∼i r2. It therefore suffices to
show that r1 ⊲⊳i r2 is a trace. We do this by induction on the length of the trace r1.
The base case is straightforward. If r1 is a trace of length one, then it consists of an initial
state s1. Similarly, r2 consists of an initial state s2. It is immediate from the assumption that
I = {〈ǫ, . . . , ǫ〉} × I0 × · · · × In that r1 ⊲⊳i r2 = s1 ⊲⊳i s2 is a trace.
Assume that the result has been established for traces of length m, and consider traces r1 and
r2 of length m + 1 with a(r1) = a(r2). Write r1 = r
′
1s1t1 where t1 is the final state of r1 and
s1 is the next-to-final state of r1, and similarly write r2 = r
′
2s2t2. By the induction hypothesis,
r = r′1s1 ⊲⊳i r
′
2s2 is a trace indistinguishable to agent i from r
′
2s2, and indistinguishable to all
other agents from r′1s1.
Let j1 be a joint action enabled at r
′
1s1 such that t1 = τ(j1)(s1), and similarly, let j2 be a
joint action enabled at r′2s2 such that t2 = τ(j2)(s2). Note that because state transitions record
the joint external action component of a joint action in the resulting state, and because a(r1) =
a(r2), we have a(j1) = a(t1) = a(t2) = a(j2). Write 〈a0, . . . , an〉 for the common joint external
action of these states and joint actions. Then we may also write j1 = 〈a0 · b0, . . . , an · bn〉 and
j2 = 〈a0 · c0, . . . , an · cn〉. To show that r1 ⊲⊳i r2 is a trace we show that the joint action
j = 〈a0 · b0, . . . , ai−1 · bi−1, ai · ci, ai+1 · bi+1, . . . , an · bn〉
is enabled at r and satisfies τ(j)(s1 ⊲⊳i s2) = t1 ⊲⊳i t2.
To show that j is enabled at r we show that each of its components is enabled at r. In the case
of agents j 6= i, we need to show that the action aj · bj of agent j is enabled at r. This follows,
using Lemma 6.1, from the fact that aj · bj is enabled for agent j at r′1s1, and from the fact that
r′1s1 ∼j r. For agent i, we need to show that the action ai · ci is enabled at r. This follows, again
using Lemma 6.1, from the fact that ai · ci is enabled for agent i at r′2s2, and from the fact that
r′2s2 ∼i r.
It therefore remains to show that τ(j)(s1 ⊲⊳i s2) = t1 ⊲⊳i t2. Note first that a(τ(j)(s1 ⊲⊳i s2)) =
a(j) = a(j1) = a(t1 ⊲⊳i t2). Thus, the states τ(j)(s1 ⊲⊳i s2) and t1 ⊲⊳i t2 record the same joint
external action. We show that they also have the same private state for each agent. In case of
agents j 6= i, we have
pj(τ(j)(s1 ⊲⊳i s2)) = τj(a(j), bj)(pj(s1 ⊲⊳i s2))
= τj(a(j), bj)(pj(s1))
= pj(t1)
= pj(t1 ⊲⊳i t2)
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In case of agent i, we have
pi(τ(j)(s1 ⊲⊳i s2)) = τi(a(j), ci)(pi(s1 ⊲⊳i s2))
= τi(a(j), ci)(pi(s2))
= pi(t2)
= pi(t1 ⊲⊳i t2)
This completes the proof. ✷
Note that because agents observe the most recent joint external action, if r and r′ are traces in
FP,E with r ∼i r′ then these traces were generated by the same sequence of joint external actions,
i.e., a(r) = a(r′). It follows from this that if r and r′ are in the same connected component of
FP,E then we also have a(r) = a(r
′). In fact, we have the following stronger result:
Lemma 6.3 For every trace r we have that:
• the connected component F of FP,E containing r consists of all traces r′ in FP,E with a(r′) =
a(r) and
• this connected component is isomorphic to the hypercube Πi=0...n{{r′}i | r′ ∈ F}.
Proof 1) We prove that r is connected to r′ if and only if a(r) = a(r′). Left to right is immediate
from Definition 6.3. Right to left follows from Lemma 6.2.
2) For each agent i = 0 . . . n, let ri be any trace of FP,E with a(ri) = a(r). To show that
the connected component is a hypercube, we prove that there is an r′ such that r′ ∼i ri. In
fact, define r′ = (. . . (r1 ⊲⊳2 r2) . . . ⊲⊳n−1 rn−1) ⊲⊳n rn. By Lemma 6.2, r
′ is a trace of E, with
r′ ∼i ri for all i = 0 . . . n and a(r′) = a(r). It is immediate that all traces r′ of FP,E with
a(r′) = a(r) are connected, and that the component containing r is isomorphic to the hypercube
Πi=0...n{{r′}i | r′ ∈ F}. ✷
This lemma characterizes the sense in which agents’ states of knowledge at times other than
time 0 in a homogeneous broadcast system are characterized by a hypercube system. Theorem 6.1
follows immediately from Lemma 6.3.
We now obtain a result that provides one final characterization of the logic S5WDn.
Theorem 6.2 The logic S5WDn is sound and complete for the class of all homogeneous broadcast
frames.
Proof Soundness is direct from Theorem 6.1. For completeness, suppose that φ is not a theorem
of S5WDn. Since S5WDn is complete for the class of all hypercubes, there exists a hypercube
H = Le × L1 × . . . Ln, where Le is a singleton, an interpretation πH on H, and a world w ∈ S
such that (F (H), πH) |=w ¬φ. We show that it is possible to construct a homogeneous broadcast
environment E whose decomposition into a union of Cartesian products contains H as one of its
components. Indeed H will be the component consisting of all the traces of length one, i.e., the
component characterizing the initial state of knowledge of the agents.
We define the environment E = 〈S, I, P0, τ, O, V 〉 as follows. For each agent i = 0 . . . n, we
take the both the set of external actions Ai and the set of internal actions Bi to be the set {ǫ}.
Thus, the set of actions of each agent is also a singleton, viz {ǫ · ǫ}. The components of the
environment are as follows:
• The set of states S = 〈ǫ, . . . , ǫ; p0, . . . , pn〉 where (p0, . . . , pn) ∈ H. Thus, the set Si of
instantaneous private states of agent i is exactly the set of local states Li of agent i in H.
• All states are initial, i.e. I = S.
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• Since the set actions ACT 0 of agent 0, the environment, is a singleton, the protocol of the
environment is the unique function P0 : S → ACT 0.
• The transition function τ is defined by τ(j)(s) = s for (the unique) joint action j and state
s. (Thus, similarly, the local transition functions τi satisfy τi(a, bi)(pi) = pi for (the unique)
joint external action a, (the unique) internal action bi and private state pi ∈ Li.)
• The definition of the observation function O is determined by the fact that E is a broadcast
environment, i.e. Oi(〈ǫ, . . . , ǫ; p0, . . . , pn〉) = 〈ǫ, . . . , ǫ; pi〉 for each i = 1, . . . , n.
• The valuation V is defined by V (〈ǫ, . . . , ǫ; p0, . . . , pn〉, q) = πH((p0, . . . , pn), q).
This is a homogeneous broadcast environment by construction. It is now straightforward to estab-
lish that for every joint perfect recall protocol P, the connected component of FE,P consisting of
all traces of length one is isomorphic to (F (H), πH). (We remark that our choice of action sets
and transition function above are not actually relevant to this conclusion.) ✷
One way to understand Theorem 6.2 is that it states completeness of S5WDn with respect to
a class of models, namely those models obtained by adding an interpretation to a homogeneous
broadcast frame. In these models the interpretation could assign to a proposition a meaning at
a trace that depends not just on the final state of the trace, but also on prior states and actions.
The proof of Theorem 6.2 in fact establishes that S5WDn is complete for a smaller class of models
with underlying homogeneous broadcast frames, in which the interpretation π is derived from
the environment. Given an environment E with valuation V , define the interpretation πE by
πE(r, p) = V (fin(r), p) for traces r of E and propositions p ∈ Atoms.
Theorem 6.3 The logic S5WDn is sound and complete for the class of all models of the form
(FE,P, πE), where E is a homogeneous broadcast environment and P is a joint protocol.
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.2. Note that the construction of this proof uses only
the initial component of the frame. The valuation of the environment may be chosen to operate as
required on this initial component. ✷
These results are in some respects similar to results of Fagin et al. [FHV92, FV86]. They show
that that there exist natural classes of systems with respect to which the logic of knowledge is not
characterized by S5n, but by a stronger logic ML
−
n , that consists of S5n plus the following axiom:
β & Ki(β ⇒ ¬α)⇒ K1¬α ∨ . . . ∨K1¬α
where α is a primitive state formula (intuitively, describing the assignment associated with the
current state, but not of agents knowledge), and β is a pure knowledge formula (intuitively, de-
scribing properties of the agents knowledge but not dealing with the assignment associated with
the current state). We refer the reader to [FHV92] for a precise explanation of these terms. In
particular, one class of systems to which this result applies is a class of systems in which the
assignment is static, agents communicate by unreliable synchronous message passing and have
perfect recall [FV86].
Theorem 6.2 provides another interesting and natural class of systems that requires additional
axioms. In our result, agents also have perfect recall, but the class is otherwise quite different
from those considered in [FHV92, FV86] since our agents communicate by reliable broadcast, and
we allow the assignment to vary significantly from moment to moment. The axiom (WD) we need
to capture such systems is also quite different from that used by Fagin et al.
We remark that it is possible to prove a variant of the results of this section that deal with full
systems rather than hypercubes. For this variant, we modify the definition of homogeneity to state
that the initial states of the environment form a full system. Moreover, instead of Assumption6.6,
we assume that for all states s and t with the same joint external action, i.e., a(s) = a(t), and for all
external actions a0 of agent 0, there exists an internal action b0 of agent 0 such that a0 · b0 ∈ P0(s)
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iff there exists an internal action b′0 of agent 0 such that a0 · b
′
0 ∈ P0(s). (Informally, this means
that an external action of agent 0 is enabled in s iff it is enabled in t.) The environment and
protocol in Example 6.1 satisfy both these assumptions.
Under these assumptions, Lemma 6.2 holds provided we restrict i and j to range over agents
1 to n only (i.e., we exclude agent 0.) The proof is a trivial adaptation. Consequently, we also
obtain an analogue of Lemma 6.3 stating that the connected components of FE,P are full systems.
7 Conclusions and further work
In this paper we have formally investigated several classes of interpreted systems that arise by
considering the full Cartesian product of the local state spaces. We have argued that these
interpreted systems provide an appropriate model for the initial configurations of many systems
of interest. Moreover, we have shown that a similar constraint arises at all later configurations
in the special case of homogeneous broadcast systems. By relating these classes of systems to
several classes of Kripke frames, we have established that a single modal logic, S5WDn, provides a
sound and complete axiomatization in all these cases. On the conceptual level, this logic provides
a well motivated example of interaction among agents’ knowledge. We hope that in the near
future S5WDn will be just one of the formal options available in the literature and that, with the
availability of more examples, a systematic study of types of interactions can be carried out.
In conducting this work, we have identified the interesting class of WD equivalence frames
that generates a complete and decidable logic. The variation of the canonical model technique we
used to prove completeness heavily relies on the frames being reflexive, symmetric and transitive,
properties guaranteed by the fact that we were analyzing extensions of S5n. This raises the
question of whether it is possible to prove similar results for weaker logics, such as S4n, which
model agents that do not have negative introspection capabilities.
Our results leave open many other questions. It should be noted that the fact that the same
logic S5WDn axiomatizes all the different classes of semantic structures we have studied is is due
in part to the limited expressive power of the language we have considered. It would be interesting
to investigate more expressive languages containing operators such as distributed knowledge and
common knowledge [FHMV95]. In the former case we have already identified the axiom φ⇔ DAφ
as of interest with respect to equivalence I frames (Lemma 3.4).
Although we have shown decidability of S5WDn, the precise complexity of this logic remains
open. It would also be of interest to determine which of the language extensions contemplated
above maintain decidability of the logic. Finally, for the dynamic model we have considered,
extensions of the language to include temporal operators are of interest. Indeed, consideration of
the logic of knowledge and time in homogeneous broadcast systems is just one example of a range
of unresolved issues concerning the knowledge of agents operating within specific communications
models: a great deal of work remains to be done in the axiomatization of logics of knowledge with
respect to such models.
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